Monthly Archives: September 2023

What are the considerations for efficient water and nutrient use in large-scale cannabis cultivation to minimize environmental impact?

Efficient water and nutrient use in large-scale cannabis cultivation are essential for minimizing the environmental impact and promoting sustainability. Here are key considerations and strategies to achieve this:

  1. Water Management:a. Irrigation Efficiency:
    • Use drip or precision irrigation systems to deliver water directly to the root zone, vertical grow rack reducing wastage and minimizing runoff.Implement irrigation scheduling based on plant needs, climate conditions, and soil moisture monitoring.
    b. Water Recycling:
    • Invest in water capture and recycling systems to reuse irrigation runoff and rainwater.Implement closed-loop systems to minimize water loss.
    c. Water Quality:
    • Regularly test and monitor water quality to ensure it meets the needs of cannabis plants and does not introduce contaminants.
    d. Mulching:
    • Apply mulch around plants to reduce evaporation and maintain soil moisture levels.
    e. Drought-Resistant Cultivars:
    • Consider selecting cannabis strains that are more drought-tolerant to reduce water requirements.
  2. Nutrient Management:a. Soil Testing:
    • Conduct regular soil tests to assess nutrient levels and adjust fertilizer applications accordingly.
    b. Balanced Fertilization:
    • Apply fertilizers in the right ratios to match plant nutrient requirements, preventing excess runoff and leaching.
    c. Organic and Slow-Release Fertilizers:
    • Use organic and slow-release fertilizers that release nutrients gradually, reducing the risk of nutrient imbalances and environmental pollution.
    d. Microbial Inoculants:
    • Incorporate beneficial microbes into the soil to improve nutrient availability and uptake by plants.
    e. Precision Nutrient Delivery:
    • Implement precision nutrient delivery systems to target the root zone and minimize wastage.
    f. Fertigation:
    • Combine irrigation and fertilization through a fertigation system to improve nutrient uptake efficiency.
  3. Compost and Organic Matter:
    • Add compost and organic matter to the soil to enhance water retention and nutrient-holding capacity.
  4. Cover Crops:
    • Plant cover crops during non-cannabis growing seasons to prevent soil erosion, improve soil health, and reduce nutrient runoff.
  5. Regulatory Compliance:
    • Stay informed about local regulations and restrictions related to water use, nutrient management, and runoff control.
  6. Education and Training:
    • Train staff in efficient water and nutrient management practices to ensure compliance with best practices.
  7. Monitoring and Data Analysis:
    • Implement monitoring systems to track water and nutrient usage,cannabis grow racks allowing for data-driven decisions and optimization.
  8. Integrated Pest Management (IPM):
    • Implement a robust IPM program to prevent pest and disease outbreaks, reducing the need for excessive water and nutrient application due to plant stress.
  9. Energy Efficiency:
    • Use energy-efficient equipment for water management, such as pumps and irrigation systems.
  10. Environmental Impact Assessment:
    • Conduct regular environmental impact assessments to identify areas for improvement and track progress in reducing resource use and environmental impact.

By integrating these considerations and implementing sustainable practices, large-scale cannabis cultivation can reduce its environmental footprint, conserve water, and optimize nutrient use while still producing high-quality cannabis products.

What equipment and infrastructure are essential for a successful commercial cannabis cultivation facility?

A successful commercial cannabis cultivation facility requires a well-planned infrastructure and essential equipment to ensure efficient and high-quality production. Here is a list of key equipment and infrastructure components:

1. Growing Facility:

  • Indoor, Outdoor, or Greenhouse Space: Depending on your location and preferences, you’ll need an appropriate growing space. Indoor vertical garden systems provide the most control but can be costly, while outdoor cultivation relies on natural conditions.
  • Climate Control: HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) systems to regulate temperature, humidity, and airflow are crucial, especially for indoor and greenhouse operations.
  • Lighting: High-quality lighting systems like LEDs or high-intensity discharge (HID) lights are essential for indoor and greenhouse cultivation. Outdoor operations rely on natural sunlight.
  • Irrigation System: Automated irrigation systems, such as drip or hydroponic setups, ensure consistent and efficient watering.
  • Security Measures: Surveillance cameras, access control systems, and security personnel to protect against theft and unauthorized access.

2. Growing Medium and Containers:

  • Growing Medium: Choose between soil, soilless mixes, hydroponics, or aeroponics, depending on your cultivation method.
  • Containers: Select appropriate pots or containers for your chosen medium, ensuring proper drainage and space for root growth.

3. Genetics and Seeds:

  • High-Quality Seeds or Clones: Source reliable genetics from reputable seed banks or nurseries. Clones can also be used for consistent results.

4. Nutrient and Fertilizer Systems:

  • Nutrient Solution: Depending on your cultivation method, you’ll need a well-balanced nutrient solution to feed your plants.
  • PH and EC Meters: These instruments help monitor and adjust the pH and electrical conductivity of your nutrient solution.

5. Pest and Disease Control:

  • Integrated Pest Management (IPM): Implement an IPM strategy that includes pest-resistant strains, natural predators, and non-toxic pest control methods.
  • Filtration and Quarantine Areas: Prevent pests from entering your facility by using air filtration and establishing quarantine areas for new plants.

6. Grow Room Layout:

  • Optimal Plant Spacing: Arrange plants to maximize space utilization and access for maintenance.
  • Workstations: Designate areas for tasks like trimming, drying, and packaging.
  • Paths and Walkways: Ensure easy access to all plants for care and inspection.

7. Water and Waste Management:

  • Water Filtration: Install water filtration systems to ensure the purity of your irrigation water.
  • Waste Disposal: Develop a waste management plan for plant waste and other byproducts, adhering to local regulations.

8. Harvesting and Drying Equipment:

  • Trimming Machines: Depending on the scale of your operation, automated trimming machines can save time and labor.
  • Drying Racks or Rooms: Designate a space for drying and curing plants with proper ventilation and humidity control.

9. Packaging and Labeling:

  • Packaging Materials: Source compliant packaging materials and containers for your final product.
  • Labeling Systems: Ensure your products are properly labeled with required information,including THC/CBD content, strain name, and warnings.

10. Compliance and Record Keeping: – Software Systems: Use specialized software for tracking and compliance with local regulations. – Documentation: Maintain detailed records of cultivation practices, including batch tracking and test results.

11. Backup Power and Redundancy: – Backup Generators: To prevent crop loss during power outages, install backup generators or battery systems.

12. Staffing and Training: – Experienced Staff: Hire skilled personnel, including growers, trimmers, and compliance officers. – Training: Provide ongoing training to ensure staff follows best practices and complies with regulations.

13. Security and Compliance Measures: – Surveillance: Install surveillance systems to monitor all areas of the facility. – Access Control: Limit access to authorized personnel only. – Compliance Expertise: Employ or consult with compliance experts to navigate the complex regulatory landscape.

14. Environmental Controls: – Odor Control: Implement odor control systems to mitigate strong cannabis odors, especially in indoor facilities. – CO2 Enrichment: Maintain optimal CO2 levels for plant growth in indoor environments.

15. Transportation and Distribution: – Transportation Vehicles: If you’re distributing your products, you’ll need suitable vehicles and secure storage for product transportation. – Distribution Licensing: Ensure compliance with transportation and distribution regulations.

Remember that the specific equipment and infrastructure requirements may vary depending on your scale of operation, cultivation method,vertical racking and local regulations. Always consult with experts and conduct thorough research to design a cultivation facility that meets your needs and complies with legal requirements.

The slippage from civil noncompliance to criminality was mirrored in enforcement practices

Human subjects in this research are protected under the Committee for Protection of Human Subjects, protocol number 2018-04-1136 , of the Office for Protection of Human Subjects at UC Berkeley.Siskiyou is a large rural county located in the mid-Klamath River basin in Northern California . Since the mid-19th century, inmigrants have historically engaged in agriculture, predominantly livestock grazing and hay production, and natural resource extraction, primarily timber and mining . Public records demonstrate that although the value of the county’s agricultural output and natural resource extraction is declining, these cultural livelihoods still shape the area’s dominant rural values of self-reliance, hard work and property rights . For instance, one county document stated that Siskiyou’s cultural-economic stability depends on nonintervention from “outside groups and governments” and residents should be “subject only to the rule of nature and free markets” . Another document, a “Primer for living in Siskiyou County” from the county administrator, outlined “the Code of the West” for “newcomers,” asserting that locals are “rugged individuals” who live “outside city limits,” and that the “right to be rural” protects and prioritizes working agricultural land for “economic purpose[s]” . We heard a common refrain that localities will eventually succumb to the allure of a taxable, profitable cannabis industry. Indeed, interviewees in Siskiyou universally reported economic contributions from cannabis cultivation, especially apparent in rising property values and tax rolls and booming business at horticultural, farm supply, soil, generator, food and hardware stores . However, a belief in an inevitable free market economic rationality may underestimate the deep cultural logics that have historically superseded economic gains in regional resource conflicts . As one local store owner told us, “I’d give up this new profit in a heartbeat for the benefit of our society.”

Many long-time farming and ranching families remain committed to agricultural livelihoods for cultural reasons ,custom racking systems even as the economic viability of family farms is threatened by increasing farmland financialization , corporate consolidation and biophysical decline . Many interviewees felt that the recent rapid expansion of county cannabis cultivation and corresponding demographic changes were a visible marker of broader tensions of cultural continuity and endangerment. As the sheriff expressed, cannabis cultivation would “jeopardize our way of life … [and] the future of our children” . This sense of cultural jeopardy , echoed by numerous interviewees, materialized in a range of negative quality-of-life comments about cannabis cultivation: noisy generators, increased traffic, litter and blighted properties, and unsafe conditions for residents. Non–cannabis farmers also reported farm equipment and water theft, livestock killed by abandoned dogs, wildfire danger, illicit chemical use and poisoned wildlife. Some non-cannabis farmers expressed a sense of regulatory unfairness — that their farms were subject to onerous water and chemical use regulations while cannabis growers “don’t need to follow the government’s regulations.” Enabling cannabis cultivators to pursue state licensure would facilitate just such civil regulation, but some feared that regulating this crop as agriculture would threaten “the loss of prime agriculturally productive lands for traditional pursuits” . If nothing less than the county’s culture and agricultural order were considered at stake, it is no wonder that absolute, even prohibitionist, solutions emerged in Siskiyou, with the Sheriff’s Office having a central role in defending local culture.Siskiyou’s sparsely populated landscape has been home to illegalized cannabis cultivators at least since the late 1960s, largely in remote, forested, and public lands in the western part of the county. Medical cannabis’s decriminalization in 1996 inaugurated a modest expansion of cannabis gardens throughout the county .

However, for the next 19 years, Siskiyou did not establish regulations for medical cannabis, in line with locally dominant ideologies of personal freedoms and property rights. Instead, the county relied on de facto management of cultivation by law enforcement and the court system’s strict interpretation of state law . In 2015, informed by public workshops held by the Siskiyou County Planning Division, supervisors passed the county’s first medical cannabis ordinance, which seemingly balanced concerns of medical cultivators and other county residents. Regulation would be overseen by the Planning Division, which placed conditions on cultivation , limited plant numbers to parcel size and would establish an administrative abatement and hearing process for complaints. The Planning Division, however, had been without code enforcement officers since 2008 budget cuts. Though the county authorized the hiring of one civil code officer in 2015, the Sheriff’s Office felt that the Planning Division “needed outside help” and moved to assist. Soon, the county’s limited abatement capacities were overwhelmed by vigorous enforcement and a wave of complainants. County supervisors, responding to the sheriff’s 2015 reports on the “proliferation” of cannabis gardens on private property, moved to heighten penalties for code violations, place numerous new restrictions on indoor growing and ban all outdoor growing . These strict county measures, which discarded and replaced publicly developed regulations, stoked reaction. When the Siskiyou County Board of Supervisors met in December 2015 to vote on these measures, advocates and cultivators presented 1,500 signatures to forestall its passage, a super majority of attending residents indicated opposition, and supervisors had to curtail 3 hours of public comment to vote. Despite this showing, supervisors passed the restrictive measures, prompting cannabis advocates to collect 4,000 signatures in 17 days to place the approved ordinances on the June 2016 ballot. Meanwhile, the Sheriff’s Office enforced the new stricter regulations .

The Sheriff’s Office assumption of code enforcement blurred the line between noncompliance with civil codes and criminal acts. Stricter ordinances, still in effect in Siskiyou, created a broad, nearly universal category of “noncompliance.” No one we interviewed, including officials at the Planning Division and Sheriff’s Office, knew of a single cultivator officially in compliance. One interviewee estimated that growing 12 indoor plants would cost $40,000 in physical infrastructure, in addition to numerous licensing and inspections requirements, effectively prohibiting self-provisioning. The Sheriff’s Office notified the public that it would initiate criminal charges against “non-compliant” cultivators, specifically those suspected of cultivation for sale , child endangerment  or suspected drug trafficking . Since the county regulations produced a situation where no one could comply, law enforcement could effectively criminally pursue any cultivator.Investigations were “complaint driven,” meaning not only that warrants could be issued in response to disgruntled neighbors upset about a barking dog on a cultivation site, as one person reported, but that police officers could serve as a kind of permanent, general complainant and take “proactive action” when they spotted code violations . Administrative warrants allowed deputies to enter properties with a lower evidentiary bar than they would have needed for criminal warrants, leading one patients rights group — Siskiyou Alternative Medicine — to file a lawsuit alleging county violations of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure . In effect, cannabis’s criminal valences in the county endured through California’s shift of cannabis from criminal to civil provenance. Formerly illegal activities continued to be formally or informally treated as criminal matters, as researchers have noted with other stigmatized activities and groups, for example, after the decriminalization of sex workers in Mexico . Also,moving rack system enforcement of civil matters can lead to substantive criminalization when those matters are stigmatized, as in the regulation of homelessness . While it is not unique for police officers to enforce civil codes, what is unique in Siskiyou County is the assumption of the entire civil process under the sheriff’s authority. To understand how this civil process became criminally inflected, in a county that voted for statewide cannabis legalization in 2016, one must first understand significant contextual shifts in who was growing cannabis where — and the challenge this posed to dominant ideas of land use, agriculture and culture. Since 2014, cannabis gardens have emerged on many of the county’s undeveloped rural subdivisions in unincorporated areas of Siskiyou. Subdivided into over 1,000 lots each in the 1960s, these subdivisions contain many parcels that are just a few acres in size and relatively inexpensive. Previously populated mostly by white retirees, squatters and a few methamphetamine users and makers, the parcels were often bought sight-unseen as investments or potential retirement properties, with most remaining unsold and undeveloped until the mid-2010s. In 2014, these subdivisions became destinations for Hmong Americans from several places, including Minneapolis, Milwaukee and Fresno; many of them cultivated cannabis. The inexpensive, sparsely populated, rural subdivisions enabled Hmong-Americans to live in close proximity to ethnic and kin networks, which multiple interviewees expressed was especially important for elders who had migrated to the United States as refugees after the Vietnam War.

The county sheriff estimated that since the mid-2010s around 6,000 Hmong-Americans had moved to Siskiyou, purchasing approximately 1,500 parcels . In an 86.5% white county with just 745 non-cannabis farms and fewer than 44,000 people , this constituted a major demographic shift. Hmong-American residents found themselves susceptible to scrutiny by white neighbors and officials. Cannabis growers in Siskiyou’s subdivisions are especially vulnerable to detection. The subdivisions are often sparsely vegetated, dry and hilly, making them not only unproductive as agricultural lands but also highly visible from public roads, horseback, neighboring plots, helicopter and Google Earth. Green screen fencing, wooden stakes, portable toilets, generators, campers, plywood houses, or water tanks and trucks often signal cannabis cultivation but would be necessary for many land uses, especially since many lots are sold without infrastructure like water, sewer or electrical access. If detection of code violations depends upon visibility, Hmong Americans on subdivisions have been made especially visible and vulnerable to detection. One lawyer, for instance, reported that 90% of the defendants present at administrative county hearings for code violations in fall 2015, when the first complaint-driven ordinance was put in place, were Hmong-American. One Hmong-American resident reported being stopped by police six times in 3 months and subjected to unfriendly white neighbors patrolling on horseback for cannabis — one of whom made a complaint for a crowing rooster, a questionable nuisance in this “right to farm” county. Numerous Hmong-Americans and sympathetic whites echoed these experiences. County residents confirmed their antagonism toward Hmong-Americans by characterizing them in interviews and public records as dishonest, thieves, polluters, negligent parents and unable to assimilate, and making other racializing and racist characterizations. While written regulations and enforcement profess race neutrality, in a nuisance enforcement regime based on visibility, Hmong Americans were more visible than others, leading many to argue that they were being racially profiled. Rhetoric emerging from the county government amplified racial tensions and visibilities. Numerous Sheriff’s Office press releases located the “problem” in subdivisions and attributed it to “an influx of people temporarily moving to Siskiyou” who were “lawbreakers” from “crime families” with “big money” and who threatened “our way of life, quality of life, and the health and safety of our children and grandchildren” . Just 2 days before the June 2016 ballot on the strict cannabis ordinances, state investigators responded to county reports that newly registered Hmong-American voters might be fraudulent or coerced by criminal actors and visited Hmong-American residences to investigate, accompanied by sheriff’s deputies . The voter fraud charges were later countered by a lawsuit alleging racially motivated voter intimidation; the suit was eventually dismissed for failing to meet the notoriously difficult criteria of racist intent. The raids may have discouraged some Hmong-Americans from voting, charges of fraud may have boosted anti-cannabis sentiment, and, one government official explained, “creative balloting” measures enabled some municipal voters in conservative localities to vote while others in more liberal places could not. The voter fraud charges, raids and legal contestation drew widespread media attention that further linked Hmong-Americans and cannabis. Amidst these now-overt racial tensions, the restrictive June 2016 ballot measure passed, allowing the Sheriff’s Office to gain full enforcement power over the “#1 public enemy to Siskiyou citizens … criminal marijuana cultivation” . Shortly after the June 2016 ballot measure affirmed stricter regulations, the Sheriff’s Office formed the Siskiyou Interagency Marijuana Investigation Team with the district attorney to “attack illegal marijuana grows” “mostly” around rural subdivisions . Within a month, SIMIT had issued 25 abatement notices and filed 20 criminal charges, in addition to confiscating numerous plants. Meanwhile, the Planning Division’s role had diminished — code enforcement officers were relegated to addressing violations not directly related to cannabis .

Virginia would benefit from MSA funds being utilized for effective tobacco control policy efforts

When Norfolk considered enacting its own restaurant smoking restriction ordinance in 2007 under the theory that its inherent police powers trumped preemption and allowed the city to prohibit smoking in restaurants from the dangers of secondhand smoke, VFHF focused on fighting the tobacco industry in the state legislature where the industry was strongest because VFHF did not take the preemption issue to litigation. Given the limitations of the 2009 state clean indoor air law, Virginia advocates need to carefully examine Norfolk’s now-abandoned proposal, and consider using such a challenge to over compremption and allow localities to protect their citizens. Fostering the aspirations of cities such as Norfolk that wish for stronger smoking restrictions could give Virginia’s tobacco control efforts important support outside of Richmond. Local coalitions, like the ones that exist but are underutilized in Virginia, have been successfully used to promote organized statewide tobacco control policy change in other states. In Maine, the state health department established the Healthy Maine Partnership, which funded communities to implement statewide tobacco control policies on a local level.This allowed for an active grassroots organization that could be mobilized, for example, to oppose threats to tobacco control funding posed in the state legislature, or to carry statewide media campaigns to local audiences. This grassroots advocacy helped Maine to maintain its high levels of tobacco control funding despite considerable threats.Likewise, the South Carolina Tobacco Collaborative established a network of local tobacco control coalitions to enact statewide policy change goals at a local level. SCTC was able to use the local coalition base to enact a number of local clean indoor air ordinances and build a significant capacity for statewide tobacco control planning and strategy.

Virginia advocates should closely examine these models,sliding track shelving system with an eye towards utilizing the preexisting network of local tobacco control coalitions, funded and organized by the Virginia Health Department’s Tobacco Use Control Program, for grassroots advocacy. Tobacco growing has declined and the elimination of the tobacco quota system has made tobacco less profitable for farmers and made tobacco a relatively unimportant crop in the state. Although Philip Morris is headquartered in Richmond, tobacco manufacturing is a very small contributor to the economy of Virginia. Virginia advocates initiated the program that evolved into the Southern Communities Tobacco Project, and established ties with tobacco farmers, which led to negotiations concerning how MSA proceeds would be distributed and a continuing dialogue that addresses the common ground that may exist between tobacco farmers and tobacco control advocates. Virginia advocates have an opportunity to further develop their relationships with tobacco farming interests, potentially finding common ground in opposing the tobacco industry as happened in South Carolina. In South Carolina, the tobacco quota buyout opened a significant rift between tobacco growers and manufacturers that was successfully exploited by tobacco control advocates, leading to support among tobacco farming interests for a state cigarette excise tax increase in 2008 and shifting legislators representing tobacco-growing communities towards a more favorable attitude to tobacco control measures.This situation has not come about in Virginia, despite the declining importance of tobacco as a crop. Because similar conditions prevail in Virginia as in South Carolina, advocates should exploit the divisions between growers and manufacturers in a similar way, which would have the added benefit of deconstructing the myth of tobacco’s unassailable power over Virginia politics. Virginia should follow the example of South Carolina and take advantage of the increasingly unfavorable attitudes of farmers towards tobacco manufacturers.

Virginia advocates should also cultivate strong ties to the governor’s office. In 2009, advocates trusted Governor Kaine to consult them on tobacco control matters, but ultimately Kaine cut them out of the process entirely. Advocates need to ensure that the governor’s office is continually lobbied and educated about the issues, rather than assuming that he or she will support their positions. VFHF proved in 2008 that working closely with Governor Kaine’s office on comprehensive restaurant smoking restrictions could advance strong tobacco control legislation further than it would have otherwise gone. In addition, VFHF’s Fredericksburg campaign has shown that even hostile legislators can change their position with regards to tobacco control legislation with sufficient pressure. Advocates should continue to work closely with, and if necessary apply grassroots pressure to, the governor’s office regardless of his or her stance on tobacco control issues. While the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation has won awards for its youth marketing activities and has finally adopted media campaigns that contain anti-industry messaging, VTSF-conducted Youth Tobacco Survey data shows that trends in youth smoking behavior in Virginia are not significantly different from national trends. VTSF needs to incorporate the lessons learned from successful programs elsewhere, such as Legacy’s “truth” campaign. As of 2009, VTSF became Virginia Foundation for Healthy Youth, and its mission has been expanded to include childhood obesity without any provisions for additional funding. Advocates should be vigilant that the obesity focus does not result in a denuding of resources available for effective tobacco control, including funding tobacco control entities that seek to reduce tobacco use in all groups, not just youth. The Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission , the other MSA-funded organization in Virginia, is also a poor use of such funds. With the tobacco quota buyout and the establishment of “Phase II” payments to tobacco growers and tobacco growing communities, TICRC should not utilize 40% of all MSA revenue.

Even a portion of TICRC’s funds could be used to significantly improve Virginia’s spending on effective tobacco control measures.Despite the challenging environment facing Virginia advocates in the near term, there are opportunities for successful tobacco control measures. Virginians overwhelmingly favor strong smoking restrictions and higher cigarette taxes, and these attitudes will continue as Virginia attracts new residents and as the tobacco farmers and manufacturers continue to contribute less to Virginia’s economy. Advocates have already demonstrated that they understand and are capable of implementing effective tobacco control tactics, such as the successful district campaign in Fredericksburg, but need to avoid the tendency to compromise too soon that has served public health poorly. With more resources and an effectively utilized grassroots base, there is no reason that Virginia should not be able to follow the example of other states in the region to implement effective tobacco control strategies.. Advocates in Virginia have an opportunity to utilize the growing support for strong tobacco control measures, if they can commit the necessary political and financial resources to the fight.There are a host of studies examining heat impacts on labor productivity and health [e.g., see ], as well as a recent spate of research around COVID-19. In the case of farm workers in California’s Central Valley Region, results show that an increase of the heat index from 95◦F to 100◦F can result in losses of agricultural productivity between 4 and 8%,sliding rack system depending on labor intensity of the crop . For COVID-19, the impact of agricultural workers’ reduction of hours of labor has been estimated to be ∼$301 M as of March, 2021 . Furthermore, pre-existing conditions that make farm workers vulnerable to heat also make them vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19. Among them are obesity, smoking status, cardiovascular conditions, and diabetes. While temperature and humidity may be inversely related to COVID-19 transmission , it remains unclear if this is due to changes in human behavior . However, to our knowledge, no research has examined the dual burden of COVID-19 and extreme heat on labor productivity and laborers’ health and livelihoods. And yet, relative to the rest of the country, COVID-19 infections are among the highest and inoculation rates among the lowest among migrant agricultural workers in the United States . This, is a quintessential example of environmental injustice with farm workers—not consumers or land owners—among those who most suffer from this dual burden. The scholarly community has an opportunity to reconcile this deficiency with more research examining the coupling of the two health burdens. With anomalous heat events due to climate change on the increase, farm workers may lose more days of work in the future. COVID-19 will increase the number of days lost and may also worsen physical symptoms during high heat periods. With extreme heat events, the body suffers water loss and potential kidney damage . Adding COVID-19 to extreme heat, in the short term, could exacerbate morbidity and increase mortality by stressing the body beyond its capacity to deal with either burden adequately, much less the combination of the two. Does the twin burden of having suffered both simultaneously worsen the symptoms of one, the other, or both? Moreover, in the long term, does organ damage from excessive heat exposure—where heatstroke can damage heart, kidneys, liver, and the brain — intensify symptoms of “long” COVID, symptoms of which we are not yet aware? To our knowledge, no research presently exists to answer these questions. COVID-19 has a detrimental effect on our most vulnerable communities, including essential agricultural laborers, considered essential workers in the U.S. .

Due to the nature of their job, agricultural workers tend to have numerous points of physical contact and few opportunities for social distancing in the workplace. Moreover, living conditions for the great majority of farm workers are substandard and often temporary as they move from place-to-place following crop harvesting . Farm workers have experienced a comparably higher rate of COVID-19 infections relative to the general population. For example, in Monterrey County, California the observed rate of positive test results for Latino/a farm workers was 22% while that of the rest of the county population was 6% in November-December 2020 . Additionally, it is not possible to carry out this form of agricultural labor remotely or virtually, making farm workers more susceptible to infections in the workplace. The negative impact of COVID-19 on farm workers is exacerbated by a decrease in the availability of farm workers and an increase in their average age . Vaccine hesitancy contributes to the negative impacts of COVID-19 on the workforce of California’s food supply. In Monterrey County, for example, only about 50% of farm workers stated they were very likely to get vaccinated, while studies show that the same figure for the rest of the country is 69% . In more rural areas of the county, women and younger farm workers are more vaccine-hesitant, largely due to a distrust of the government, lack of information on the effectiveness of the vaccine, and concerns with side effects . The pandemic poses significant economic impacts to migrant farm workers and their families. For example, when farm workers become ill due to COVID-19, lose work hours, productivity, and income. Workers often need to continue working even when testing positive for COVID-19 . Working while infected with COVID-19 is likely to result in lower worker productivity, resulting in income loss . This action also presents an additional risk of infection to the rest of the agricultural workers, which multiplies the financial impact, as well as the long-term health impacts of COVID-19 on the agricultural labor force. Furthermore, farm worker income reduction due to COVID- 19 restrictions and infection impacts not only farm workers but also those who depend on the farm worker financially. For example, an impacted farm worker may become unable to pay for basic needs such as food, housing, electricity, and/or water for the farm worker’s family and/or other household members. Furthermore, the negative impacts of COVID-19 expand beyond the immediate family of the farm worker to those who depend on remittances in their home countries. Migrant farm workers, particularly in the Central Valley of California and southern U.S. states, endure extreme heat during the summer and early fall. Prolonged exposure to intense heat combined with physical labor can be deadly to agricultural workers, and numerous migrant worker deaths occur each year due to these circumstances. The CDC reports that heat deaths among crop workers are 20 times greater than among U.S. civilian workers, even when farms are in compliance with heat related safety regulations . Moreover, research has shown that from 2005–2014, 198 non-U.S. citizen deaths occurred on farms, which is over triple that of U.S. citizens . Further, many of these deaths and illnesses may not be counted due to cause of death , linguistic or cultural barriers, immigration status, and other factors . Exposure to heat over time can lead to severe illnesses such as heatstroke, dehydration, cardiovascular disease, and critical organ failure .

The tobacco control advocates’ reactions to SB 1112 were largely negative

Two other laws were enacted in the 1996 session that affected youth access restrictions. HB 1416, sponsored by Del. Bill Mims was intended to require photo identification to prevent youth sales. As introduced, the law required a retailer to ask for photo ID unless the retailer had reason to believe that the purchaser was older than 30. Appearance was not to be a defense in the case of violation. The bill was heard in the House Courts of Justice committee, chaired by Del. Almand, where it was substituted with weaker language on February 10 by a vote of 15-7 that only required the vendor to ask for proof of identification “from an individual whom the person has reason to believe is at least eighteen years of age or whom the person knows is at least eighteen years of age.” Additionally, if the retailer had asked for and reasonably relied upon photo ID provided, the retailer could use this as a defense against an action brought for violation. In this form, HB 1416 passed both houses and was signed by Gov. George Allen in April. This weak bill represented a victory for tobacco retailers and the tobacco industry. HB 1231, introduced by Del. Connally, was also passed in 1996. As introduced, it required that any vending machine that dispensed tobacco products had to be located at a restaurant, hotel, private club, tobacco store, or a jobsite where there is an “insignificant portion” of workers under the age of 18. Vending machines in restaurants, hotels, and motels were required be located within the “line of sight” of the proprietor. Also, proprietors whose vending machines operated in restaurants, hotels, or motels had the option of converting the machines to accept only tokens, which required photo ID to purchase, and would override the other restrictions on placement. HB 1231 was heard in the same committee as HB 1416 and was also amended to remove the specific establishments that could utilize vending machines, and instead permitted vending machines in any place that was not open to the general public and not generally accessible to minors. If the vending machine was in a place open to the public,cannabis indoor growing systems line-of-sight placement was required, unless the machine was at least 10 feet away from a public entrance or required tokens to operate.

The Department of Agriculture was authorized to conduct compliance checks. In this form, the bill passed both houses and was signed by Allen in April. This represented a tobacco industry victory; research has shown that provisions like those of HB 1231 are ineffective in reducing youth access to tobacco products from vending machines; the only effective method to reduce access is to locate vending machines in adult-only areas venues.Both HB 1231 and HB 1416 were, according to a PM timeline of AAA activity, supported by the cigarette manufacturers and their allies, and that PM actively “worked for their enactment.”PM noted that “all segments of the [tobacco] industry” favored the enactment of both bills.We were unable to identify any role that the health advocates played in the enactment of either of these bills. Since youth access laws were first on the books in Virginia, enforcement had been the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies, which rarely acted. Tobacco Institute lobbyist and former attorney general Anthony Troy had first proposed the idea of using the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to enforce youth access laws in 1994, but it took until 1997 for the idea to gain traction. By that time, Gov. George Allen was in office and making youth access laws a priority of his administration. This was due in part to pressure from tobacco control advocacy groups like the Coalition on Smoking OR Health, which conducted petitions and media events in early 1995 as part of a campaign called “Kids Against Tobacco.”The campaign sought to publicize the areas that children were not completely protected from cigarette smoke, such as public schools where teachers were allowed to smoke in staff-only areas.In addition, it is likely that Allen was responding to publicity surrounding the federal Synar Amendment. The concern over youth access was also a product of the gubernatorial race between Republican Gilmore and Democratic Lieutenant Governor Don Beyer. Incumbent Governor George Allen  had appointed new members of the ABC board who supported their agency taking on an enforcement role. This action served to shore up Allen’s credentials in fighting youth smoking rates, and both Gilmore and Beyer competed to be the “toughest” on youth smoking issues.

Troy and Allen worked together on the ABC enforcement issue and agreed that Allen, and not Troy, would be given credit for the move if it came to fruition.Allen’s Attorney General, James Gilmore, was also strongly supportive of the ABC proposal, positioning himself with respect to Beyer on the campaign issue.Gilmore had close ties to the tobacco industry, having attended a Philip Morris fundraising event for his campaign on a Philip Morris corporate jet in March 1997, where he received a $20,000 check from Philip Morris.In 1996, he had accepted $12,000 from Philip Morris in campaign contributions. In 1997, the Tobacco Institute conducted at least one major fundraising even on his behalf.The legislative vehicle for the ABC legislation that Allen and Troy agreed upon in 1997 was HB 2530, introduced by Del. Bill Mims . As introduced, HB 2530 allowed members of the ABC and their agents to issue a summons for any violation of tobacco access laws. Tobacco control advocates were not impressed by HB 2530. While it was generally agreed on all sides of the issue that ABC agents were competent theoretically to enforce youth access laws, questions were raised by health advocates about whether resources existed to enforce the law. Concerning the former, Gilmore said that as governor he would ensure that the ABC agents would get additional funds to conduct enforcement activities if they requested them. Carter Steger of ACS welcomed that statement, but just after HB 2530 was introduced stated to the press that she was “extremely worried about the establishments that sell cigarettes but not alcohol. The smaller the store, the more likely the sale.”ABC agents responded by saying that they would study the costs of going into these retail outlets where they usually did not operate and would request additional funds if necessary. They also noted that the ABC board was self sustaining, generating more revenue on its own than it withdrew from the state’s general budget, which they felt would alleviate some the resource-scarcity concerns.As passed, the law changed very little. In its final form, the bill removed the word “member” from the language, simply stating that agents of the ABC were allowed to issue summons for violations. The bill was enacted with an emergency clause by the governor’s amendment, which meant the law took effect at the moment it was signed on April 2.

Gilmore counted HB 2530 as a major legislative victory in his position as Attorney General.In the 1998 session, Almand presented a bill, HB 1368, which called for licensing tobacco retailers, the provisions that had been stripped from the AAA bill he had introduced in 1996 as HB 853. The bill was supported by officials at ABC, who recognized that licensing would allow them to identify more retailers to conduct compliance checks. In 1998, only 8,000 tobacco retailers were on the ABC roster,vertical racking system less than half of the total number of tobacco retailers in Virginia. This facet of the bill was also welcomed by health advocates, including Neal Graham, director of youth control programs at the Virginia Department of Health . Steger from ACS also welcomed the move, stating that it would increase the ability of Virginia to conduct youth enforcement activities.Additionally, with Master Settlement Agreement talks underway , the ABC and the Board already authorized to check for youth access compliance per HB 2530 which had passed in 1997, ABC favored by Gov. Gilmore as a potential tobacco control agency.Opponents, including Troy from the Tobacco Institute and legislators like Del. Eric Cantor , said that the licensing bill was premature and that Virginia should wait for guidance from the federal level before enacting anything.Retailers also opposed the bill. Initially, Gilmore opposed the licensing plan and suggested that instead of licensing retailers to gain access to information useful for enforcement and compliance checks, that the Virginia Tax Secrecy Act be amended to give ABC access to state information about tobacco wholesalers, which could be used to create a list of tobacco retailers.Tobacco control advocates pounced on Gilmore’s suggestion, with ALA executive director Kurt Erickson noting that licensing is “one of the best tools for cracking down on folks who sell tobacco to minors.” Erickson also questioned why Virginia needed to “go to the federal government to get a list of tobacco retailers in its own state? It makes no sense.”Eventually, the bill died after Gov. Gilmore created a compromise that satisfied most parties, including health advocates. HB 1368 was dropped and HB 1430 was introduced at the request of the governor. HB 1430 was carried by Del. Almand, and gave the ABC access to records formerly secret under the Virginia Tax Secrecy Act that allowed the ABC to use state tax records to compile a database of retailers. The bill also gave ABC the power to use the records for purposes of inspection and enforcement. However, the bill did not give VDH or the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services access to the information despite the fact that they were responsible for monitoring retailer compliance.Health advocates and the administration were enthusiastic about the compromise, which allowed them to strengthen youth sales oversight without dealing with the divisive licensing issue.

Kurt Erickson, director of the Northern Virginia ALA, said to the press that Gov. Gilmore should be “commended for such a swift and deliberate response” to the licensing issue.Ultimately, Gilmore signed the bill into law in April after it was approved by both houses. Speaking to the press just before HB 1430’s passage, Steger credited the evolution of the youth smoking issue on national events, mainly the settlement with the tobacco industry that was then being debated, saying “What’s happened on a national level has filtered down even to Virginia. It’s given legislators the cover they need to achieve things they probably wouldn’t have touched in the past.”She also said that while advocates had desired licensing, the compromise had given the state knowledge of who was actually retailing tobacco, which was desperately needed. Other advocates, like ACS lobbyist Sarah Bedard, said the compromise would give them political strength to push the following year for licensing and for vending machine bans.Cooperation between tobacco growers and the tobacco industry notably declined between 1997 and 2008 due to political and economic ramifications of changes made to the U.S. tobacco market during that period. Starting in 1933, the U.S. tobacco market had been regulated by the federal Tobacco Price Support Program operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The program was established to improve tobacco producers’ income through control of supplies, as well as to protect the market from manipulation by tobacco manufacturers trying to keep prices low as they had under the auction system prior to 1933. The program included two primary components: 1) an acreage allotment and an annually-set poundage quota for tobacco growing based on demand from tobacco product manufacturers, and 2) a price support system guaranteeing a minimal price for tobacco grown within the quota system not purchased at auction. This system created tobacco quota holders who had the exclusive right to grow tobacco; they could also lease that right to other farmers. The Tobacco Price Support System operated effectively through the early 1990s, but as tobacco manufacturers began to use more foreign grown tobacco and poundage quotas began to decrease correspondingly, tobacco grower organizations began to support eliminating the quota system. Growers argued that the quota system put U.S. growers at a competitive disadvantage because of the costs associated with leasing quotas to separate growers, that the price support system could be manipulated by tobacco manufacturers and that the acreage quota locked growers into producing tobacco with land that could be profitably used for other crops.In the late 1990s, several proposals circulated in the federal government to eliminate the quota system, all of which would have included a “quota buyout” to compensate existing quota holders .

The reservations centered around a feeling in the Council that the restaurant restrictions would harm businesses

It was no surprise that a legislator representing the Hampton Roads area , like Sen. Northam, would support smoking restriction legislation. Most of the localities in that area were considering asking the General Assembly to pass legislation giving their locality the power to enact some sort of local restaurant smoking restriction and Norfolk had been seriously considering enacting local restaurant restrictions under the assumption that preemption did not apply to their municipality until backing off the proposal in 2008 .Lawmakers representing the Hampton Roads area, including Sen. Northam; Sen. Quayle and Sen. Mamie Locke also pushed for statewide laws that either repealed preemption statewide or allowed their locality greater authority to regulate smoking.On January 25, 2008, House Speaker William Howell referred all of the smoking related bills to General Laws Committee, notoriously hostile to tobacco-control legislation.Howell had close financial ties with the tobacco industry, having accepted $10,000 in campaign contributions since becoming Speaker in 2003.This is significantly more than the median tobacco industry campaign contribution to House Republicans from 1999-2007 . Del. Terrie Suit , who had previously supported Gov. Kaine’s restaurant smoking restriction proposal in the 2007 session, chaired the General Laws Committee. According to House rules, Del. Suit in her role as chair of the committee could have asked to have a bill brought before the full committee by using House Rule 18. Despite the fact that Del. Suit represented an area with a high support 250 for restaurant smoking restrictions, she refused to allow the bills to come before the full committee and instead funneled them into the hostile Alcoholic Beverage Control/Gaming Subcommittee ,indoor grow rack where they were all killed after no further action was taken.An editorial in the Virginian-Pilot questioned why her position had changed and raised several points as potential answers.

Del. Suit maintained that her support waned when many local restaurants in her district voluntarily went smoke free. The editors pointed out that many other areas, including whole communities in her district like Saxis, Big Stone Gap, and others, had very few smoke free choices. Despite the fact that Del. Suit did not accept, and on one occasion returned, tobacco industry contributions, she did owe her chair personship of the General Laws Committee to Speaker Howell. Public health advocates felt the same way. As Cathleen Grzesiek, co-chair of VFHF, described, once Suit “became chair of [the] General Laws [Committee] … all of a sudden she no longer supported clean indoor air laws.”Tobacco control advocates from the Virginia Beach area turned up the political heat on Del. Suit after realizing that she had the power to determine whether these bills were to die in committee. The primary group that pressured Suit was the Virginia Beach Restaurant Association , which urged its members — who were constituents of Del. Suit in the South Hampton Roads area — to tell her to reverse her decision.In addition, the VBRA took out a full-page ad in the Virginian-Pilot urging readers to pressure Del. Suit to move the bill out of subcommittee for the consideration of the full General Laws Committee.Noting that it seemed unfair that just seven legislators could keep a bill from the other 93 members of the House and that there seemed to be broad legislative support for such a bill, a past president of the VBRA stated that “we [the VBRA] feel all representatives should have a chance to vote on it.”Meanwhile, other hospitality industry groups, including the Virginia Hospitality and Travel Association, remained opposed to the bill.VFHF also employed phone banking to target Suit, as well as Speaker William Howell, Dels. Thomas Gear and David Albo who were members of the ABC/Gaming subcommittee. The primary activity against Suit, however, came from the VBRA.Advocates were outraged that the bills ended up in the ABC/Gaming subcommittee. Hilton Oliver, the executive director of Virginia GASP, said “[t]he issue of smoking in restaurants has nothing to do with ABC and gaming, but it has a lot to do with health.

They are playing games [there in the House], no question about it.”Virginia politics and the influence of Speaker Howell had placed the anti-smoking bills into hostile committees, like many other times before. VFHF held that at a minimum, the bills deserved a fair hearing by the full committee.The debate mirrored the same arguments that had been made in Virginia ever since the issue of smoking restrictions first emerged in the 1970s. Many on the General Laws Committee continued to point toward free market principles to justify opposing the legislation. For example, Del. Gear argued, “[i]t’s wrong for government to intervene and tell restaurants they have to do something.”Del. Suit argued that the General Assembly did not need to act on the proposal and that voluntary smoking restrictions were already happening.She stated “[t]wo years ago … I couldn’t find a restaurant that was smoke free. But because of this debate, the whole issue over the last few years has been elevated to the level that so many restaurants have gone smoke free, I no longer believe it’s necessary for the government to step in and do it.”As before, representatives from the Virginia Retail Merchants Association, Virginia Hospitality and Travel Association, and Cigar Association of Virginia spoke of the bill in terms of “choice and property owners’ rights.”Nathan Jones, a Richmond resident and owner of 13 restaurant franchises, claimed that a restaurant law in Indiana caused a 10- 15% drop in alcohol sales, which Mr. Jones claimed could “kill a small business” in a year.These often-repeated claims about the harm to small business interests from tobacco restrictions – the centerpiece of the tobacco industry’s efforts to generate local opposition to such laws since the 1980s – are false.In particular, a 2003 analysis of all the research on the economic impact of smoking restrictions on the hospitality industry, including bars and restaurants, showed no negative impact on revenue.Despite the pressure from several sides, Del. Suit did not change her position, and the legislative session ended in March with no tobacco restriction bills surviving.All the tobacco control bills before the ABC/General Laws Subcommittee were defeated unanimously by voice vote rather than a recorded vote.The reason, according to Gov. Kaine after the vote occurred, was that “[t]hese guys don’t want to be on the record on a matter like that.”Norfolk enacted their original smoking ordinance in 1988, which provided for nonsmoking sections in restaurants and many other public places, and prohibited smoking completely in many retail stores.

This made it stronger than the subsequent state law passed in 1990. In May 2006, Theresa Whibley, a physician,vertical growing racks was elected to the Norfolk City Council. After being elected, Whibley began to push for an ordinance that would that would completely prohibit smoking in restaurants after reading the 2006 Surgeon General’s Report “The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke,” which among other findings reported that eliminating indoor smoking fully protects nonsmokers from harmful effects, while ventilation and separation of smokers from nonsmokers within an enclosed space did not.What Whibley read in the Surgeon General’s Report dovetailed with her personal convictions and experience as a physician that second hand smoke was harmful.No other Hampton Roads area city had smoking restrictions at the time and Whibley felt that the city “need[ed] to take the lead” on the restaurant smoking issue.When she joined the Norfolk City Council, she began inquiring whether the Council could prohibit smoking in restaurants.Whibley sought help from City Attorney Bernard Pishko, who informed her that Norfolk’s charter allowed the city to implement a restaurant smoking restriction without requiring permission of the General Assembly. Pishko argued that neither Dillon’s Rule nor the preemptive language of the VICAA impinged upon Norfolk’s inherent police powers granted by its charter. Therefore, any ordinance that correctly invoked Norfolk’s police powers would be valid. While the VICAA explicitly preempted stronger local regulation of restaurants or bars, Whibley and Pishko had compiled a great deal of evidence that demonstrated that no level of secondhand smoke exposure was safe, and that because of this no law that required no-smoking sections could adequately protect the health and welfare of patrons or workers.Based on this fact, the Norfolk city attorney’s office drafted language for the proposed ordinance that simply required any nonsmoking area to be “effective.” Because the only effective protection for workers and patrons would be a 100% smoke free interior space, Whibley and Pishko were confident that their “effectiveness” language was a valid exercise of the city’s police powers.

Both Pishko and Whibley expected the ordinance to be challenged in court if enacted but felt that they could argue successfully that this approach was consistent with both Dillon’s Rule and the requirements of the VICAA. Whibley and Pishko were the primary motivators for the proposed ordinance, but, after learning about their proposal, the Virginia chapters of the national voluntary health organizations offered material support and publicity, primarily to identify and promote restaurants that were smoke free.After discussing the idea with the City Council in December 2006, the Council voted to endorse the idea but to hold off on enacting any ordinance until it became the results of the debate about statewide legislation affecting restaurants would be.City Manager Regina Williams scheduled hearings in January, 2007 for restaurant owners to address their concerns, as a majority of restaurateurs had come out as opposed to the ordinance, primarily based on concerns that the ordinance would harm their business. These concerns were echoed by some on the Council, such as Vice Mayor Paul Riddick, who was concerned that it would affect the livelihoods of small business owners.The Norfolk Restaurant Association opposed the proposed ordinance, but in a 2009 interview Whibley characterized their complaints as not very vociferous.On July 10, the state Attorney General’s office released an opinion by Virginia Attorney General Bob McDonnell that stated that such restrictions would violate the VICAA’s preemption language, which was issued in response to a request from Del. Bill Janis . In response, Norfolk’s City Attorney, Bernard Pishko, told the press his opinion was that the police powers inherent in Norfolk’s charter were sufficient to allow the restrictions to be implemented without asking the General Assembly for permission.In August 2007 the City Council decided to go forward with their plans to restrict smoking in restaurants within the city despite McDonnell’s opinion, based on Pishko’s advice to the council that it made no difference as to their ability to enact stronger local restaurant restrictions.In October 2007, the Council voted 7-1 to implement an ordinance that completely prohibited smoking in restaurants and bars . As passed, the 2007 ordinance was significantly stronger than state law, completely prohibiting smoking in restaurants and bars, with an exception only for establishments conducting a private function in the entire space. It maintained many of the other provisions of the 1988 ordinance. By completely prohibiting smoking in restaurants or bars, Norfolk’s ordinance not only would have protected the health of workers and patrons, but it was also significantly stronger than the 2009 statewide legislation, which allowed for both smoking rooms and ventilation. However, the ordinance would not have gone into effect until July 2008, and before that date arrived the Council shifted its position in early 2008 on the restaurant smoking restriction issue. Five council members rethought their support, citing the failure of statewide or regional smoking restrictions in the General Assembly.Barclay Winn, a council member whose interactions with Virginia Beach led to the Hampton Roads regional approach, said that he wanted a “minor revision for sports bars … I just want to be sure we get a level playing field.”Another council member, Vice Mayor Anthony Burfoot, wanted to include a provision that allowed restaurants the ability to appeal the restriction if they can show resulting economic damage.Council member W. Randy Wright felt that the Council “can’t put our establishments at a competitive disadvantage.”As the five council members backpedaled, Whibley expressed frustration and hoped that the law would be implemented unchanged.Ultimately, despite Whibley’s efforts, the Council moved steadily towards a vote rescinding their earlier ordinance. At the end of March 2008, the Council voted to rescind the restriction, partially because it seemed that a statewide restaurant smoking restriction would soon pass .

The tobacco industry’s tactics had tangible effects on ASSIST public health advocacy nationwide

Philip Morris also sought to introduce fiscal and ethics complaints through state government groups, to pressure state Attorneys General to act on those allegations. Additionally, PM pursued allegations of waste in charities, focusing on charities in ASSIST coalitions.190 TI was also heavily involved in preparations to counter the ASSIST program. Early in 1992, Samuel Chilcote, Jr., the TI president, made anti-ASSIST efforts TI’s “ongoing, toppriority project.”TI’s plan involved preparing field staff with information about ASSIST funding and expenditures, and, in conjunction with the tobacco industry law firm Covington & Burling, exploring the use of local “sunshine” laws to require additional reporting of ASSIST financial information.TI also planned to increase their field staff’s ability to disrupt any ASSIST legislative activity in several states, including Virginia.Finally, TI coordinated efforts with Lorillard, PM, and RJ Reynolds to increase the dissemination of their ineffective “smoking accommodation” messaging in ASSIST states to counter ASSIST programming.Misuse of Freedom of Information Act requests was another disruptive tactic that had two results that were favorable to the tobacco industry.First, these requests tended to bring ASSIST coalitions’ advocacy work to a halt as they struggled to comply with voluminous requests for information, much of it spurious. Secondly, they gave the industry useful information about ASSIST spending and programming that could be used to organize attacks.In most of the 17 ASSIST states,rolling shelving systems health advocates reported that the tobacco industry’s efforts to disrupt ASSIST efforts had some impact on their effectiveness, despite the fact that many of the tobacco industry’s claims were meritless.

Carter Steger reported that “every now and then Philip Morris would flood our 800 number [when ASSIST was phone banking] so we couldn’t call out.”Marge White, an Assistant Field Director for ASSIST recalled in a 2009 interview that the tobacco industry efforts to oppose Virginia’s ASSIST program had several components. She noted that the industry heavily lobbied the legislature against ASSIST’s policy components. In addition, the tobacco industry approached several of the venues that ASSIST was helping to go voluntarily smoke free and attempted to dissuade them from adopting clean indoor air policies.White also recalled that law firms working for the tobacco industry would submit FOIA requests for significant amounts of data very close to Virginia ASSIST deadlines for quarterly reports or grant applications, causing a lot of disruption.While actively opposing public policy efforts, the tobacco industry did not oppose Virginia ASSIST efforts regarding youth prevention programming.Because it was uncontroversial, a consensus emerged in the ASSIST coalition that youth should be the key focus population and that most resources should be devoted towards youth activities, primarily training youth to become community advocates for other youth.These projects included assessments of the proximity of tobacco advertising to schools, spot-checking tobacco retailer compliance with sales-to-minors laws and advocating for voluntary clean indoor air policies in their communities in venues such as malls and restaurants.ASSIST provided materials such as stickers and signs for distribution.ASSIST’s adult staff also designed and distributed curriculum guides to schools that included lesson plans on how to integrate tobacco prevention into such subjects as math, social studies and English.ASSIST adult staff also participated in conferences targeting teachers to offer sessions on tobacco prevention and to distribute the curriculum guides.After a planning period, ASSIST began advocacy in Virginia in 1992. During that year, ASSIST had teething problems related to membership and leadership.

The Membership Committee recognized that ASSIST had gaps in important membership segments, including minority populations, the media, and the politically involved.In addition, a lack of strong leadership and confusion regarding the role of local coalitions hampered coalition recruitment efforts.By later in the year, a permanent chairperson position was established and ASSIST was able to conduct coalition trainings.In 1993, ASSIST established working relationships with the Tri-Agency Council and GASP, the only other active tobacco control groups in the state at the time.Together, the three groups successfully urged Gov. Wilder to veto SB 859, a 1993 smoker’s rights bill supported by the tobacco industry.ASSIST was also invited to assist Wilder’s staff in developing a plan to implement the youth access requirements of the Synar Amendment , which was the first time ASSIST was able to work with the governor’s inner circle.During this year, ASSIST also developed a legislative policy agenda that aimed to make the VICAA stronger by repealing preemption;however, during 1993 ASSIST’s legislative activity was largely confined to planning future activity and monitoring legislative activity. ASSIST’s local coalition activity during 1993 consisted mainly of helping local coalition members develop and distribute voluntary tobacco control policies and distributing “awareness” materials such as stickers and banners to raise awareness of tobacco control issues in the state.Clean indoor air policies for schools became a focus in 1994. ASSIST placed clean indoor air ads in high school and university sports programs, and delivered awareness materials such as “Smoke Free Class of 2000” kits to schools.ASSIST also worked to recognize and publicize venues that had voluntarily gone smoke free.During 1994, many malls had surprised ASSIST by unexpectedly adopting clean indoor air policies.177 ASSIST worked to capitalize on the publicity generated by the mall policies by creating signage to distribute to the malls promoting their smoke free status.

Similar signage was provided to some restaurants in Virginia that went smoke free.White recalled that all of the indoor malls in Virginia eventually went smoke free except for one, as well as several hundred restaurants.In addition, in 1994 ASSIST became more involved in tracking legislative activities, setting up a hotline that provided information about legislation being considered in the General Assembly, and training ASSIST coalition members about legislative issues.These activities coincided with increased tobacco industry opposition to ASSIST nationwide involving accusations of illegal lobbying tactics and misusing Freedom of Information Act requests to hamper ASSIST activities . ASSIST responded by issuing clarifications about the scope of acceptable advocacy, reiterating that members acting in their role as ASSIST representatives could not issue materials that adopted a position or opinion about proposed legislation.Another ASSIST goal was to limit smoking in sports venues. Due to the perception that changing stadiums’ smoking policies in a tobacco growing and manufacturing state would be more easily accomplished with a focus on youth prevention, the ASSIST coalition asked their media committee to develop a youth-focused program. The project began by identifying existing partners who had sports programs or organizational ties to sports programs, and in 1995 ASSIST approached 7 minor league baseball organizations requesting donated advertising space.All of the teams refused but did allow paid counter-advertising. Eventually, some of the teams allowed sponsored youth tobacco prevention events and ASSIST helped to promote these clean indoor air activities.The public response was positive, and by 1996 ASSIST offered to assist the management of these teams to develop no-smoking policies by providing them with model policies.By 1997, 3 stadiums had adopted 100% smoke free seating and 4 stadiums had adopted smoke free family sections.ASSIST’s involvement in sports arena efforts expanded to a semi-professional soccer franchise, when the Hampton Roads Mariners decided to go smoke free after working with ASSIST.ASSIST also created some events to capitalize on their relationship with the teams, such as creating a “Sack the Pack” event in partnership with a local television sports department. ASSIST involvement also lead to one minor league baseball manager joining the coalition,rolling shelving racks resulting in the removal of a Marlboro Man advertisement from that team’s stadium.Virginia’s most notable accomplishment during ASSIST was a 4.7% reduction in adult smoking prevalence, second only to Maine, and a remarkable accomplishment for a tobacco state.

This also was better than the greatest reduction achieved by a state not in the ASSIST program, Georgia, at 4.4%188 Another accomplishment of ASSIST, in the opinion of Carter Steger, was that “just forming coalitions across the state on tobacco control was a huge accomplishment in Virginia.”83 Marge White noted that the ASSIST local coalitions, mostly developed by the Virginia Department of Health , and their relationships with the national health voluntary organizations continued after ASSIST ended.ASSIST had difficulty finding support among legislators for its policy goals. In a 2009 interview, Carter Steger remarked that, “Every now and then you’d find a champion, but that was more out of personal conviction … there’s this acceptance in Virginia that tobacco is so strong – Philip Morris is so strong that you kind of have to accept that you’re not going to be as progressive as another state.”Another issue was stability among coalition members, with staff turnover being a significant problem. Steger recalled, “I think there was a period of time during ASSIST that was very stable in terms of staffing. … But when the funding streams changed, turnover started – The nonprofit world traditionally has turnover. But even in the health departments when the funding streams changed, this ability of the staff that had worked as a cohesive unit started to change.”83 ASSIST laid the groundwork for some ongoing tobacco control work. One of the coalition partners, the University of Virginia’s Institute for Quality Health , was awarded a Smoke Less States grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to develop a collaboration between tobacco growers and tobacco control advocates. These efforts eventually lead to the Southern Tobacco Communities Project, and to the Virginians for a Healthy Future youth smoking cessation group .ASSIST also stimulated the formation of the VDH’s Tobacco Use Control Program, and for VDH to remain active after the ASSIST program ended in tobacco control work, keeping its network of local coalitions active and ready for collaboration with future statewide tobacco control coalitions. Virginia ASSIST, however, generally adopted weak policy change goals and focused on conservative and low-impact programming that carried little risk. ASSIST failed to target the tobacco industry aggressively and instead focused on encouraging voluntary clean indoor air policies on a local level. ASSIST did not fight statewide preemption and did not seek any statewide legislative policies. After the completion of the ASSIST program, the funding for TUCP shifted from NCI to the National Tobacco Control Program funding from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Office on Smoking and Health . The migration to CDC funding represented a transitional period for TUCP, as long-time staff members like Neal Graham and Marge White left and TUCP took on new staff and adjusted to the new parameters and lower levels of funding. Schaeffer recalled that these changes caused disruptions.In addition, local coalition partners needed to be retrained. TUCP provided technical assistance, training, and similar materials to Virginia advocates. One of the groups that was provided technical assistance by TUCP was the Virginians for a Healthy Future coalition.181 In addition, TUCP maintained close ties with a network of local coalitions and health districts and partner organizations that shared TUCP’s mission. These local coalitions were not focused on policy change, but instead worked on local cessation, community education, and promotion of voluntary clean indoor air policies.The SmokeLess States Initiative was a series of three programs from 1993 to 2004 funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and administered by the University of Virginia School of Medicine. SLS was intended to support statewide tobacco control coalitions by implementing several policy goals: 1) reducing the number of children and young people who start using tobacco; 2) reducing the number of people who continue using tobacco; and increasing the public’s awareness that reducing tobacco use is an important component of any major effort at health care reform.Virginia received a grant in each of the three phases of the program.In 1994, Virginia was awarded a two-year capacity building grant to build a tobacco control coalition to implement the policy goals of SLS. The grant was revised and renewed in 2000, at which time the grant applications more explicitly prevented the funds from being used for lobbying, as RWJF’s grantees had been the subject of allegations that funds were inappropriately being used for lobbying purposes.The intention of the grant renewal was to shift the program to a policy-only model, embodied in a three-year grant of up to $1.5 million, with the University of Virginia again designated as the grantee.

It was an industry vehicle to enact statewide preemption of local ordinances

SB 1993 was introduced around the same time by Del. George Grayson , which was an extremely weak bill that only required no-smoking areas in very limited areas of hospitals and did not specify an enforcement agency, although it did specify a $3,000 fine for violation. It was amended in the House Health, Welfare, and Institutions committee to be completely voluntary with no provision for fines or enforcement. Grayson attempted to substitute the bill with its original language, but the measure failed, and the bill died when the legislature adjourned without considering it further.In response to HB 430 and SB 130, the tobacco industry quickly rallied to draft a bill that would serve its interests. Senator Virgil Goode, Jr. who was very sympathetic to tobacco interests, introduced SB 601, which gave private employers and the governing bodies of hospitals and institutions of higher education the sole authority to designate no-smoking areas. It also included preemption language that prevented any locality from enacting stronger restrictions in private workplaces after July 1, 1989.Goode’s bill merely codified a right that private employers, hospitals, and institutions of higher education already had.It was no secret by this point that the industry was pushing for preemption. In February 1989 some newspapers, including the Hampton Roads Daily Press and the Christian Science Monitor, had picked up on the preemption language in several bills.As it became clear to the press that Goode’s statewide law would “take away local government’s power to enact laws restricting smoking in public places,” newspapers began specifically referring to the preemption aspect of the bill.

Initially, Goode’s bill to end local ordinances regulating tobacco was to take effect immediately,commercial shelving systems but it was amended to change the implementation date several times. While the bill was being considered, Anthony Troy met with Del. Cohen to discuss the situation. Both men determined that neither side would be able to claim a decisive victory over SB 601, and came up with a compromise – a one-year sunset provision that would freeze any local ordinances regulating tobacco until July 1, 1990, postponing debate on the issue of local regulation and giving both sides a chance to regroup.Cohen agreed to this sunset provision on the condition that industry forces would meet with health groups to discuss finding common ground on state-wide legislation concerning smoking restrictions.On the strength of this understanding, Goode’s bill was overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 84-14 in the House, and the Senate concurred with the final date of implementation 38-0, sending the bill to Governor Gerald L. Baliles .Virginia GASP members were not pleased with the moratorium. On March 22, 1989 they held a vigil in Richmond attempting to influence Gov. Baliles to veto the measure.These efforts were unsuccessful; Gov. Baliles explained that he signed the bill for two reasons: it was passed overwhelmingly, and would only be in effect for one year.Donley had previously approached Baliles’ office in an attempt to secure his support for clean indoor air legislation. After Baliles left office, Donley learned that Baliles owned a large amount of stock in a tobacco company, Dimon, Inc., although she was unaware of whether he had this financial interest during his term as governor.He later became a member of the board of directors at Philip Morris in 2008.The tobacco industry had mustered their significant resources to block the Grayson/Michie bills. Michie later described how “outmatched his anti-smoking witnesses were.”While proponents of the bills relied on the testimony of health advocates, the industry used its powerful influence with retail and manufacturer associations.

According to Michie, “[t]he Virginia Manufacturers’ Association spoke against my bill; the retail merchants spoke against it; the restaurant association spoke against it; the Farm Bureau spoke against it; and then, finally, the AFL-CIO spoke against it.”In a newspaper interview later that year, the Vice President of the Tobacco Institute, Walker Merryman, was candid about the industry’s influence over these interest groups, stating “[o]bviously, [opposing the bill is] made a lot easier if you have a lobbyist who’s been in the state capitol and knows the executive director of the state hospitality association and the state chamber of commerce and the state AFL-CIO and all the other groups that might help.”With this intensive lobbying pressure from tobacco industry forces, many legislators were influenced, but some were not swayed. Del. Ralph Axselle described his sentiment that “Philip Morris is one of Richmond’s premiere corporate citizens . . . [t]hey do a lot of good things for their community; they run a good company.”However, Del. Axselle sent out a questionnaire to his constituents, and 85% of the respondents supported smoking restrictions.Based on the support of his constituents for smoking restrictions, Axselle voted against the industry-sponsored measure, SB 601.GASP noted that two other legislators, Sens. Holland and Walker, also changed their votes to oppose the tobacco industry’s position based on letters from their constituents solicited by both GASP and the Tri-Agency Council.One of the tobacco control advocates’ goals for the meeting was to attempt to sway traditional tobacco allies away from their entrenched support for the industry. As Anne Donley of GASP told the Associated Press at the time, “My biggest hope is that these groups who have traditionally supported the tobacco industry will begin to see through the propaganda.”However, industry groups did not break ranks, citing tobacco industry language about “accommodation” and smoker’s rights, tactics commonly used by the industry to weaken the position of health advocates at the expense of public health. Industry lobbyists Troy and Sutherland strenuously opposed any effective restrictions on smoking whatsoever, claiming it would lead to job losses and decreased sales of tobacco products. Furthermore, the Tobacco Institute’s position was that “[t]he tobacco industry will never agree to allow Virginia to have any laws stronger than what any other tobacco state has.”

The Virginia Manufacturer’s Association and the Virginia Restaurant Association both agreed with the Tobacco Institute lobbyists. The Virginia Hospitality Association made their position clear that they wanted no regulation of restaurants, strongly preferring voluntary restrictions.From the industry perspective, the growth of the Washington DC suburban areas in Northern Virginia had changed the demographic makeup of the state, diluting some of the historically important electorate of the tobacco-growing regions. Furthermore, the industry was feeling the growing influence of the health advocacy groups and their support from the public in the tobacco control arena. The Tobacco Institute blamed the necessity for such action on both changing demographics and to the more aggressive and organized tactics of the health voluntaries and tobacco control organizations.The Tobacco Institute’s final position was model legislative language taking an aggressive position that sought not only to prevent new local laws but sought to roll back all existing local ordinances that regulated smoking in restaurants.The proposed language only prohibited smoking in limited areas such as elevators and public buildings,mobile shelving systems while requiring no-smoking areas in retail businesses, healthcare facilities, and restaurants with more than 50seats.It would not have regulated smoking in bars, private hospital rooms, or common areas of malls.The industry language also sought to disallow the regulation of smoking in private workplaces, leaving those decisions entirely up to management.This proposal was completely unacceptable to the health groups at the table.After three meetings, the groups did not reach an agreement and the meetings concluded in late 1989. Both sides presented draft legislation to each other during the meetings, but none were acceptable to the other side. The tobacco industry groups presented two bills and Cohen and Michie presented several bills, including a modified version of the Virginia Beach smoking restriction ordinance.Despite a lack of agreement between the two sides, Donley in 2009 felt that the meetings had positive side effects.For one, the industry had insisted that neither side speak to the media during the meetings; this lead the press to speculate about what might be occurring in the meetings, which kept the public engaged with the issue of smoking restrictions.

Furthermore, GASP, ALA and ACS used the summer of 1989 to organize their volunteers and members to continue to call and write to legislators pressing them on the issue.Thus Donley felt that an important but unforeseen outcome of the meetings was that it prevented the momentum generated in the 1989 session from flagging before the 1990 session began. The fight in the 1990 legislative session was anticipated well in advance, with both the industry and health advocates bracing for a fight as the moratorium ended. However, the substance of what might actually pass was still greatly in flux. On January 3, 1990 the Richmond News Leader conducted its annual legislative survey that probed opinions on a variety of issues. Of the 18 senators and 52 delegates who responded to inquiries, 41 responded in opposition to a preemptive statewide smoking law; at that point strong majorities of responding legislators supported allowing localities to regulate smoking. The poll did not gauge legislators’ opinions about a statewide smoking law.In a 2009 interview, Donley of GASP said that she had not been aware of this survey at the time.Also early in 1990, the Tri-Agency Council formed a new coalition, Virginians for Clean Indoor Air , to include more groups in the Tri-Agency Council’s push for clean indoor air legislation.By January 10, VCIA had recruited eight other state groups: the Virginia Medical Society, the Virginia Perinatal Association, the Virginia Chapter of the March of Dimes, the American Diabetes Association of Virginia, the League of Women Voters of Virginia, Virginia American Academy of Pediatrics, Virginia Pediatric Society, and the Virginia Nurses’ Association of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.GASP was not included in the group, and GASP and VCIA would support different bills in the 1990 session. The VCIA quickly took a deal-breaker position opposing local preemption, with William Miller, a spokesperson, stating, “This is not a point for compromise.”The VCIA announced that the bill they would sponsor would be introduced as SB 440 by Sen. J. Macfarlane , who had been an opponent of clean air legislation. Nevertheless, a VCIA spokesperson called Macfarlane’s proposal “a modest and reasonable bill.”As introduced, the bill had strong anti-preemption language, explicitly stating that its statewide provisions were the minimum standards governing public health preemption and that local governments could adopt “consistent” but stronger local ordinances. However, the statewide provisions were very weak ; no coverage was given to restaurants or retail establishments, and many public spaces such as schools and healthcare facilities were only given partial coverage. SB 440 was subsequently amended in the Senate Local Government Committee where the strong anti-preemption language was replaced with strict preemption which would sunset in four years.The VCIA would not show GASP, Del. Cohen, or Sen. Michie the language of SB 440 prior to introducing it. In a 2009 interview, Anne Donley of GASP recalled that it was surprising that the VCIA kept Cohen and Michie in the dark because they had worked together before on the same issue. As Donley remarked, “you never did that to a legislator. You would never go behind their back … when you’ve been working with them and supporting them.”Donley recalled that it was common in the legislature at the time, as a courtesy, to give both legislative allies and opponents some forewarning of a bill pertinent to that legislator, so he or she would not be surprised or embarrassed about not knowing its contents. Donley characterized this as a “betrayal” to Cohen and Michie.The Macfarlane bill competed with Del. Cohen’s and Sen. Michie’s bills, HB 562 and SB 150, which did not included preemption, had a higher $50 fine for violation and had clear enforcement language. Michie and Cohen characterized Macfarlane’s bill as progressive, but also felt like it did not go far enough in restricting smoking in retail establishments. HB 562 and SB 150 both designated retail stores with more than 20,000 square feet as public places, requiring the person in charge of the space to “designate reasonably substantial areas of the public place as nonsmoking areas.” However, Macfarlane’s bill, SB 440, required no-smoking areas only in designated “public breathing spaces.”

Policy scores indicated that Republicans were also significantly more pro-tobacco industry than Democrats

Democrats had controlled the Senate until 1999, when Republicans seized control for the first time in history. From 1999 to 2007 Republicans maintained this majority until Democrats regained control of the Senate in 2007. Democrats controlled the House from 1998-2000, and from 2000-2010 Republicans controlled the House. Therefore, Republicans controlled the entire General Assembly from 1999-2007. The fact that campaign contributions tend to go to the incumbent party partially explains why Republicans were given 209% more contributions in total from 1999-2007 than the Democrats . Republican legislators received significant greater campaign contributions than Democrats in 2007 and in total . Members of the Senate received significant greater contributions than members of the House in 2007 and in total .There was no significant different in policy scores between the two houses of the legislature . To investigate the relationship between policy scores and campaign contributions, we conducted a regression of policy score against party, amount of contributions and house. Because Sen. Walter Stosch received substantially more money than any other member of the legislature, $ 43,245 in 2007 and a total of $90,072 from 1999 to 2007, with the next largest contributions being given to Del. Robert McDonnell received no contributions as a legislator in 2007 but from 1999 to 2007 received $67,242, we included a dummy variable for him in the analysis to control for the fact that,mobile system because he was such an outlier, he was a leverage point in the regression. Table 11 shows the result of this analysis. These results show that, as with the univariate analysis, Republicans were significantly more pro-tobacco than Democrats.

Controlling for party and house, for every $1000 in campaign contributions received in 2007, legislators were -.6 points more pro-tobacco industry and for every $1000 in total contributions they were on average -.1 points more protobacco. period . In 2000, Sen. Stosch joined the Board of Directors of Universal Corporation, a Richmond-based tobacco leaf processor and merchant, while he was a sitting senator.Stosch supported preemption of local smoking restrictions in the debate over a statewide smoking law in 1990,and sponsored Philip Morris-supported legislation in 2005 to end alleged anticompetitive practices by smaller tobacco manufacturers.Philip Morris contributed $35,279 of Stosch’s $90,072 total tobacco industry campaign contributions from 1999-2007. Del. McDonnell received the second-highest amount of tobacco industry contributions. McDonnell opposed tobacco control measures; notably, as Attorney General in 2009 McDonnell opposed restaurant smoking restrictions proposed by the powerful Republican House Speaker William Howell . Del. William Bolling , while receiving the third-highest tobacco industry campaign contributions, generally remained silent on tobacco issues but was a strong proponent of childhood obesity prevention.Lobbyists in Virginia must register with the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth, and lobbying expenditures must be reported every twelve months . These expenditures are available in a publically accessible database hosted by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.Available data extends back to the 2006 legislative session. The tobacco industry relies on a well-funded and politically connected lobbying effort to oppose tobacco control legislation.Highly-paid tobacco industry lobbyists often forge relationships with powerful legislative allies in order to use quiet, behind-the-scenes tactics to advance the industry’s policy goals.By creating such an “insider” network and consistently outspending health advocates, the tobacco industry has been very successful in its lobbying efforts at a state level.

This situation also prevails in Virginia, where the tobacco industry invested heavily in lobbying. The industry outspent tobacco control advocates nearly 3 to 1 from 2005 to 2009. In total, the tobacco industry spent $2,054,355 from 2005 through 2009 compared to tobacco control interests, which spent $691,305 . Altria/Philip Morris alone spent $778,042, the largest amount of any other individual tobacco industry entity. The tobacco industry in Virginia counted on a broad range of allied interest groups to further its aims. For the most part, the groups made themselves available to industry interests to lobby against perceived anti-tobacco legislation. In some instances, the groups formed coalitions in order to more effectively oppose bills, often organized and implemented by the Tobacco Institute. For example, in 1989 the Tobacco Institute lined up a coalition of nine of the groups listed in Table 17 to oppose clean indoor air legislation expected to be introduced in the 1990 session.As elsewhere, the tobacco industry used trade and hospitality groups to help oppose clean indoor air laws as part of the industry’s continuing program to manipulate such groups into being more credible spokespersons for the industry’s positions.Nationally, Philip Morris was the first tobacco company to initiate a campaign to recruit hospitality industry groups. In 1989, PM employed these relationships to oppose clean indoor air legislation and to distribute industry developed rhetoric concerning accommodation of smokers, which pressured lawmakers to weaken the language of proposed restrictions.Also, hospitality groups were used to promote the claim that economic losses for hospitality establishments would result from smoking restrictions, despite the fact that such claims have been proven false.The Virginia Hospitality and Travel Association had been a primary ally of tobacco industry interests in Virginia. Its subgroup, the Virginia Restaurant Association , was also the main statewide organization for restaurants, VRA having merged with the VHTA in 1993.

The VHTA had been an ally of the tobacco industry since at least 1988, and had participated in a number of activities promoting tobacco industry positions, such as working with the Tobacco Institute to establish a network of industry favorable restaurants and hotels.VHTA was also part of the tobacco industry coalition that opposed the 1990 Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act ,35 and opposed clean indoor air legislation up to and including the 2009 VICAA revision of restaurant smoking restrictions. Convenience store trade associations, including petroleum marketers, were allied with tobacco industry interests nationwide to oppose youth access restrictions and increased cigarette excise taxes.In Virginia, the Virginia Petroleum, Convenience, and Grocery Association supported the tobacco industry’s “We Card” youth access initiative in the 1990s.36 They also opposed increased cigarette excise taxes, including a 2009 attempt by Virginia tobacco control groups. Business groups were allied with the tobacco industry since at least the 1960s. For example, Philip Morris was a corporate member of the Virginia Chamber of Commerce since at least 1967.The Virginia Chamber of Commerce later worked closely with the Tobacco Institute to undermine efforts to enforce statewide clean indoor air laws in the early 1990s.The Washington, DC-based Tobacco Institute , founded in 1958, was the major tobacco manufacturers’ primary public relations and lobbying organization, until it was dissolved in 1998 as a result of state lawsuits against the tobacco industry. TI retained one of the most influential lobbyists on the tobacco industry side, Anthony F. Troy, from at least 1988 until TI dissolved in 1998 .Troy was a former Virginia Attorney General,rack shelving system serving from 1977 to 1978. In addition, Troy was a partner with the influential law firm Troutman Sanders since 1978, and was a lobbyist for Brown, Williamson & Lorillard from 1998 to 2001.40 Troy’s long running presence in Virginia as a TI lobbyist and his prestige as a former attorney general gave TI a strong voice in Richmond. As of 2009, Troy was still a registered lobbyist in Virginia, but did not list any tobacco industry entities as clients for the period of lobbyist disclosure information available .The Tobacco Institute also supported tobacco industry-aligned interests, which in return provided the Tobacco Institute and tobacco manufacturers with a source of grassroots support .TI also had several employees who were influential in organizing activities in Virginia. One employee was Page Sutherland, who served as the regional director for TI in the region that included Virginia. Sutherland had started in 1967 with the Richmond office of the Tobacco Tax Council to oppose cigarette excise taxes, and was funded by the tobacco manufacturers in much the same way as TI. The Richmond TTC merged with the TI in 1982, and its employees were incorporated into TI. The Tobacco Action Network served as the grassroots arm of the TI and was composed of manufacturers’ employees and sales representatives, wholesalers, retailers, and the general public. It was started in 1977 with the purpose of conducting such grassroots activities as letter-writing campaigns. TAN was operated out of the TI general budget.

TAN’s Southeastern area manager was John Bankhead. His district covered the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.Page Sutherland was also a State Director for Virginia with TAN.TAN was not implemented in the tobacco-growing southeastern states until after 1982. In 1982, the Tobacco Institute determined that these states required additional efforts to establish relationships with tobacco growers so that TAN could count on their assistance when needed.The hesitancy meant that in the interim, TAN would focus on gathering support only from the employees of tobacco manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and suppliers.In Virginia, TAN attended hearings to oppose local smoking restrictions, such as the 1979 Falls Church smoking ordinance .However, after this TAN does not appear to have played a very active role in changing legislative opinions or garnering media attention. In a 2009 interview, Anthony Troy, who was the Tobacco Institute’s primary lobbyist in Virginia since 1980, recalled that TAN played little if any role in the tobacco industry’s activities in Virginia.The relationships between tobacco growers and tobacco growing associations with the tobacco industry were not formalized, but existed due to an implicit understanding of the dovetailing interests of the tobacco industry and the growers; the Virginia Farm Bureau, for example, did not agree with the tobacco industry on issues such as tobacco subsidies, but the tobacco industry could count on the Farm Bureau to support their position on issues that would be detrimental to their shared interests, such as clean indoor air laws.While the tobacco growers and the tobacco manufacturers largely shared similar interests with regards to tobacco control legislation, the growers did not take a leading role in opposing tobacco control efforts as they had in other states such as South Carolina.In Virginia, according to a 2009 interview with Anthony Troy, tobacco growers served as a grassroots auxiliary for the tobacco manufacturers.For example, when the tobacco companies wanted to put grassroots pressure on legislators through a letter writing campaign, they would ask for the assistance of the tobacco grower associations. However, it was the Tobacco Institute and the tobacco manufacturers themselves that led the principle efforts to combat tobacco control legislation, and the tobacco growers and grower associations were politically peripheral.Nonetheless, the historical importance of tobacco to Virginia made the tobacco farmers an important rhetorical tool of tobacco industry interests. Tobacco manufacturing is declining in Virginia, further reducing the political importance of tobacco farming with regards to tobacco control issues. Nationwide, cooperation between tobacco growers and the tobacco industry notably declined between 1997 and 2008 due to political and economic ramifications of changes made to the U.S. tobacco market during that period. Starting in 1933, the U.S. tobacco market had been regulated by the federal Tobacco Price Support Program operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The program was established to improve tobacco producers’ income through control of supplies, as well as to protect the market from manipulation by tobacco manufacturers trying to keep prices low as they had under the auction system prior to 1933. The program included two primary components: 1) an acreage allotment and an annually-set poundage quota for tobacco growing based on demand from tobacco product manufacturers, and 2) a price support system guaranteeing a minimal price for tobacco grown within the quota system not purchased at auction. This system created tobacco quota holders who had the exclusive right to grow tobacco; they could also lease that right to other farmers. The Tobacco Price Support Program operated effectively through the early 1990s, but as tobacco manufacturers began to use more foreign-grown tobacco and poundage quotas began to decrease correspondingly, tobacco grower organizations began to support eliminating the quota system. Growers argued that the quota system put U.S. growers at a competitive disadvantage because of the costs associated with leasing quotas to separate growers, that the price support system could be manipulated by tobacco manufacturers and that the acreage quota locked growers into producing tobacco with land that could be profitably used for other crops.