Where other buyers exist, producers may try to increase property rights and bargaining power by retaining ownership of any surplus yield. For example, the contract could explicitly reserve any production surplus over the maximum to the producer or preserve the right of the end-user to request surplus biomass priced under the contract’s default compensation provision. On the other hand, contracts also must consider allocation of catastrophic risk. Over time, it is likely that weather, pests, drought, flooding, wind, or hail will impact biomass production on a given farm. No such product exists for biomass as of this writing. End-users require a consistent supply to accommodate conversion facilities, but a biomass farmer that fails to harvest a crop 243 has no revenue to perform the contract via spot market purchases—especially when there is no spot market for biomass. Accordingly, contracts should specify conditions for performance excuse and contingency provisions. Moreover, in the absence of a government safety net along the lines of crop insurance, biomass contracts should consider minimum revenue provisions to provide the farmer with some compensation. One way to soften this effect on the end-user is through the use of an amortized payment schedule. Producers would receive a guaranteed cash flow during all years of production to cover costs, but later payments could be diminished to allow the end-user to recover the costs throughout the life of the contract. Contracts could also require crop insurance, once available, botanicare trays and use insurance proceeds to offset initial contingency provisions.Once the crop is established, producers face a number of issues during the growing phase.
Some production contracts may require very specific production practices in order to decrease end-user supply risk and require monitoring of crop quality. These requirements decrease producer autonomy, and diminish potential gains from producers’ individual management skills and experience. Heavy requirements may also restrict the producers’ flexibility to adjust management practices to various production environment scenarios. On the other hand, considerable production risk arises from inexperience and lack of knowledge with producing energy crops. Inexperience or ignorance may cause a producer to adopt a production practice harmful to the crop or environment. In addition, the producer may be unsure how to address new production hazards, such as a new pest, drought conditions, or invasiveness. Thus, inexperience and lack of knowledge creates risks and costs for producers. End-users may desire to increase producer control through the biomass production agreements. As a general rule, however, contracts should allow producers as much freedom as possible to choose production practices. A principle of the Sociological Compatibility perspective is that producers value autonomy and demand compensation in some form for the loss of autonomy to satisfy participation constraints. Moreover, adjusting cultural practices is a traditional risk management tool for producers. For example, producers may choose to apply fertilizer in the fall to avoid higher prices in the spring, decide to plant later to avoid risk of a late frost and insect pests, and producers may choose to plant herbicide resistant crops and apply herbicides rather than mechanically cultivate crops to reduce weed competition. Because incentive contracts enhance producer risk, and rigid production practices foreclose other risk management strategies, other methods of dealing with end-user production risk are preferable. In other words, production practices have very poor separability, and thus respond poorly to incentives.
A better strategy may be for biomass production agreements to employ the use of generalized legal standards rather than specific practices to control production, which would shift contracting costs from the front to back end, while providing greater producer autonomy. A singular focus on incentives to maximize yield, however, is fraught with potential downside risks to long-term sustainability and suitability with end-user needs. For example, there is a tradeoff between corn stover removal, soil erosion, and fertilizer inputs. Removing high percentages of crop residues increases the risk of soil erosion from water and wind. Excess stover removal to increase per acre yield in one year will require additional fertilizer for the following crop year. Excess fertilizer can then impact the composition of the resulting biomass, especially its mineral content, which can then impact the ethanol conversion process. Additional fertilizer application also shifts the carbon footprint of the biomass feedstock or precipitates other environmental externalizes . Research also has suggested that the loss of soil organic carbon serves as an additional constraint for corn stover harvest. Similarly, harvest timing and cutting depth of both corn stover and perennial biomass crops must balance yield, moisture content, nutrient storage in the rootstock, soil compaction, and wildlife habitat over the winter. At the establishment stage, producer discretion in initial crop variety selection could impact potential invasiveness or migration of genetically engineered plants. Accordingly, incentives in biomass supply contracts should provide producers sufficient flexibility to manage production and harvest decisions within the context of their other farming operations and long-term environmental values. As discussed in more detail in Section IV, infra, sustainability standards address many of the environmental tradeoffs identified above and embed balancing criteria to allow for producer autonomy within the context of environmental, social, and economic sustainability. Incentive contracts could look to or even incorporate third-party sustainability certification programs for guidance in allocating risks and responsibilities among producer and end-users with respect to balancing yield with environmental impacts.
In addition to, or complementary with, third-party sustainability certification, monitoring through the use of fieldmen may provide the most favorable strategy to address moral hazard during establishment and maintenance. Although developing the fieldmen model may take time, the benefits discussed in the framework likely outweigh the costs. Contracts can incorporate this model by elaborating on the “cooperation provision” outlined in the information sharing section. In addition to requiring notification of any material change in circumstances that may affect performance of either party’s obligations, the contract could create a right of the end-user to inspect the producer’s premises. In order to be of value to producers, end-users should employ the services of agronomists or individuals with knowledge and experience in biomass crop production, a requirement likely worth adding into the contract. Qualified fieldmen also can provide an excellent avenue for information sharing and education—an important risk management tool. In addition to inspections, the contract should authorize producers to request fieldmen services. Moreover, fieldmen could be enabled to authorize contract modifications or excuse performance. This strategy enhances producers’ social interaction factors, and could be coupled with assistance for sustainability standard certification.End-users deploy biomass production agreements to secure a stable supply of biomass, as well as other important characteristics, such as moisture level, foreign matter, mineral profile, BTU content, size and shape, and its environmental footprint. Risk arises when the producer is required or incentivized through penalties or bonuses for these crop attributes. While the producer may have control over some attributes, others evade manipulation. Strict consequences, such as rejection or price docking, create large risks for producers. Moreover, when minimum requirements are defined loosely, end-users may be able to engage in opportunistic behavior. To minimize holdup, biomass contracts should incorporate reasonable margins of error to account for normal environmental characteristics, as well as procedures for third-party verification and re-measurement.Storage and transportation of the low-density, high-volume biomass from the producer to the end-user presents unique challenges and should be considered carefully in the biomass supply contract. Assigning responsibility for storing and transporting implicates both risk- and cost-minimization strategies of contract design. For example, a set delivery date in the contract provides certainty, but indirectly assigns the storage burden—perhaps to both parties—and requires careful planning. On the other hand, an “on end-user demand” clearly shifts responsibility for storage to the producer and may dictate harvest timing despite other agronomic or environmental considerations. In contrast, an on-harvest delivery term places storage responsibility—and attendant risk of loss—on the enduser. Transportation responsibilities tie directly into product specifications and storage. If the contract requires certain harvesting methods or preprocessing requirements, flood table such as pelletizing or densification, the farmer may incur significant upfront equipment costs to produce the required result. However, some producers seek flexibility to minimize processing and transportation costs, such as forage chopping, directly into road transportable wagons, or pelletizing biomass in the field to decrease volume. In sum, up-front consideration should be given in the contract to linking product specifications with optimal storage methods to minimize post-harvest loss and maximize transportation efficiencies. The very high level of asset specificity, along with specialized equipment, places significant post-harvest risk in the farmer who has little bargaining power in a single-buyer market.
Accordingly, a more complete contract to minimize hold-up risk may be necessary to induce contract acceptance by the farming community.From a producer perspective, several factors influence the choice of land for biomass production. Perhaps most important is opportunity cost. In the Midwest, where much of the land is highly productive and can support currently higher value crops , energy crops, such as Miscanthus and switch grass, are unlikely to compete for scarce land resources. Biomass may be relegated to more marginal lands with lower opportunity cost, such as pasture or hay ground. Perennial biomass crops do provide, however, a number of environmental benefits, such as erosion control, improved soil and water quality, increased wildlife habitat, and increased soil organic carbon. Producers, therefore, may want to take advantage of these benefits and grow energy crops on at least marginal land to provide these long-term and environmental benefits. In addition, studies have shown that soil types can affect the composition of biomass plants, such as the percentage of lignin, cellulose, ash, and mineral content. In this way, land choice can significantly influence the quality and value of the resulting biomass crops. End-users have two strong preferences concerning the choice of land. First, in order to secure a stable biomass supply, endusers would prefer to tie biomass production to land title, rather than tying production requirements to individual producers. This strategy permits end-users to be less concerned with producer default, as land resources remain dedicated for biomass production. Other than outright purchase of land by the enduser, more creative avenues exist, such as equitable servitudes, covenants, or easements, to produce biomass that would attach to land title and provide more supply security than long-term lease agreements. Second, end-users prefer that biomass production be located near the end-user’s facility to decrease transportation costs. Where the end-user assumes the responsibility of transporting the biomass, local production is especially important. Longer transportation routes also increase greenhouse gas emissions, thereby decreasing the energy balance of the crop. Local production creates cost and risk for producers in two main ways, however. First, producers lose the traditional agriculture risk management strategy of geographical diversification; they cannot spread out production over larger areas to decrease weather and pest risk. Second, requiring local production limits the producer’s ability to produce energy crops on marginal ground or land exiting the Conservation Reserve Program. These production dynamics create a number of concerns for producers. First, as discussed in the Sociological-Compatibility Perspective, a producer may be unwilling to relinquish that level of control over his land; producers’ land is usually their most critical asset. Second, the greater the degree the land title is locked into biomass production, the greater the level of asset specificity, increasing the risk of holdup or renegotiation. Moreover, most producers grow crops on a combination of owned and leased land, with farmers depending on rental land resources to achieve economies of scale. Tying biomass production to land title, therefore, tightens the producers’ participation and incentive compatibility constraints and necessitates higher compensation.On the other hand, the multi-year production cycle for perennial biomass crops injects unique risk concerns into the farmland rental market. Producers may have difficulty securing leases for the duration of the production contract or even the life cycle of crops, such as switch grass and Miscanthus. Moreover, landowners may be concerned with the short- and long-term effects of biomass production on the land itself, or how to remediate the land back to its prior use if the end-user defaults on the biomass supply contract—a particular concern due to asset specificity. To provide safeguards and regulate producer practices, traditional leases have often relied on legal standards and duties .