The potential applicability of the interest group mechanism identified in this paper across policy domains also has implications for fundamental models of lawmaking in American politics. Standard models conceive of lawmakers as primarily driven by the preferences of the median voters in their districts, which are generally taken as exogenous . Alternative perspectives suggest that lawmakers are primarily responsive to the pressures of organized interests seeking to advance policy goals, and moreover, that the ability of competing groups to influence politics is structured by the existing policy-scape . Findings presented here support the notion that existing policy, in part by shaping interest group capacities, affects congressional representation. This paper therefore provides quantitative empirical grounding for the difficult-to-test arguments in favor of the policy-focused approach— and one empirical framework for scholars working in this vein.Wealthy foundations have taken on increasingly prominent roles influencing education policy in the U.S. This paper uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence to study the drivers and implications of the engagement of major foundations in the politics of charter schools. I show that states that adopted favorable charter laws, in addition to empowering charter schools as political actors, also drew wealthy foundations into the charter policy space by enabling them to make investments in developing new schools. Foundations later sought to protect those investments, leveraging strategic grant-making to drive the growth of a pro-charter advocacy network with national scope. Findings underscore the importance of state policy experimentation in catalyzing new interest group coalitions,commercial racks with implications for ideas about policy reform in American federalism.

In recent years, contests over policies governing charter schools have generated some of the most hard-fought battles in state politics. In 2016, Massachusetts voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have lifted the state’s cap on charter schools to allow 12 new schools each year after a $33 million campaign—at that point the most expensive in the state’s history. A few years later, in 2019, on the other side of the country, California Governor Newsom signed legislation adding restrictions to new charter schools after a big-money campaign pitting teachers unions against charter advocates. That teachers unions and other incumbent organized interests in the K-12 education sector would resist charter schools makes good sense. Teachers unions are some of the most active and well-resourced organized interests in American politics, particularly at the state and local levels where most education policy is made . Teachers at charter schools are much less likely to be unionized , so the rise of charter schools poses an acute threat to their continued strength. And while funding formulas vary across the states, broadly speaking, the more students enroll in charters the less funding is available to district schools, so the growth of charter schools also threatens union jobs in the long run. What is somewhat more surprising is the emergence of a well-resourced pro-charter advocacy coalition battling to defend and expand chartering. This coalition often includes charter schools themselves, who also are sometimes able to drum up grassroots support among the parents of their students. But, as of 2017, charter schools only enrolled about 6 percent of all public-school K-12 students . Even large charter networks like The Knowledge is Power Program do not have the resources to go toe-to toe with teachers unions in the political sphere. And charter school parents are usually lower income people of color—not a group seen as particularly powerful in American politics. More fundamental to the pro-charter political coalition than the schools themselves are wealthy philanthropists and the advocacy groups they fund.

For instance, Great Schools, which spent $23.6 million in 2016 to try to raise a cap on the number of charter schools in Massachusetts was bank-rolled primarily by the Walton family and Michael Bloomberg . Indeed, existing research has documented how the coordinated engagement of wealthy foundations has been fundamental to the emergence of a pro-charter coalition of interest groups combining a national scope with local on-the-ground presence . This paper traces the emergence and growth of this pro-charter coalition and studies its implications for the politics of education. I argue that the rise of the pro-charter education coalition depended fundamentally on early policy victories during a particular “window of opportunity” for the charter school movement. Advocates took advantage of the broad attention to education reform in the 90’s and early 2000’s to pass “charter laws” across a wide range of states. These laws provided a legal framework for new charter schools to be authorized. I show that, even though a majority of states adopted charter laws in this period, charter sector growth depended fundamentally on a smaller set of states with highly pro-charter policies. This growth, I argue, was essential for building a broader political coalition supported by foundations. In the 90’s and early 2000’s, foundations’ primary role was to provide financial and technical support to charter schools to get up-and-running. But the involvement of these foundations in directly supporting schools and other charter operations planted the seeds for subsequent political engagement. As charter schools grew and came under increasing pressure from hostile teachers unions, foundations recognized that the continued growth and viability of the charter school sector depended not just on their operational support— but also on the development of a pro-charter political coalition. Drawing on data submitted to the IRS by non-profit organizations , I document a shift in foundation grant-making towards greater political advocacy. Elite interviews suggest that key foundations recognized the importance of building political capacity through grant-making to defend earlier investments in the charter movement. The consequences of the rise of this foundation-funded, nationally scoped, political coalition have been profound.

Exploring several mini-cases, I show how foundation-funded groups have been fundamental to efforts to expand charter schools to new locales—and seek to defend charter schools in places where they have gained a foothold. This analysis has implications for our understanding for how reforms challenging incumbent vested interests can unfold over time. As Finn, Manno, and Wright write: “Aside, perhaps, from mayoral control, chartering is by far the most significant manifestation of structural and governance innovation in public education…” . What is interesting about this case for the literature on public policy reform is that, unlike other durable reforms , the advent of charter schools—except in some extreme cases like New Orleans —has largely failed to dislodge incumbent education interests. While charter school policy reforms have, to an extent, politically empowered charter schools and charter networks themselves,greenhouse rolling benches these interests have been less important to the broader pro-charter coalition than foundations. More so than generating their own interest group supports by conferring benefits , early charter laws changed the politics by drawing previously sidelined political actors—in this case, foundations—into the charter coalition. The role of philanthropists in politics is a growing and important topic of study in political science . With greater inequality concentrating wealth at the top of society, foundations have developed ever-greater financial resources . In addition, a growing cadre of living donors have sought to leverage strategic grant-making and political engagement to accelerate structural change by driving policy shifts . But this paper shows the relationship also goes in the other direction: how foundations engage in politics is shaped by prior policy decisions through policy feedback dynamics . The paper unfolds as follows. I first provide background on the growth of charter schools in the U.S. and discuss the importance of state policy decisions for the charter school sector. I then trace the emergence of a pro-charter political coalition, highlighting the role of state experimentation with charter laws in building this coalition. I proceed to present several minicases that underline the importance of this pro-charter political coalition to expanding and defending charter laws. Finally, I discuss implications for understandings of policy reform over time in American federalism and conclude. Laws allowing for the establishment of public charters schools were adopted in 40 states in the 90’s and early 2000’s. The first to adopt was Minnesota, which passed its charter law in 1991. The federal government also adopted new charter school policy in this period. The Federal Charter School Program, initiated in 1994 by amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, directed critical funding to support the growth of charter schools in states that allowed them . The expansion of charter schools generally coincides with greater choice in K-12 education. Where charters have become established, parents can opt to send their children to either publicly funded charter schools or district schools tuition-free. Charter schools are publicly funded, but privately operated. Governance from authorizers under state jurisdiction, versus local school districts, generally allows them greater autonomy than traditional public schools Charter schools’ political momentum came in part from renewed attention to education policy in the 80’s and 90’s. Several reports were published in the early 1980’s highlighting major issues in the American K-12 education system.

The most famous of these was A Nation at Risk , which famously claimed that: “Our society and its educational institutions seem to have lost sight of the basic purposes of schooling, and of the high expectations and disciplined effort needed to attain them” . The report’s call for politicians to pay greater attention to education was heeded, even as the analysis underpinning its key findings were later disputed . In the 1980’s, the states and the federal government experimented with a wide range of education reforms ranging from teacher certification standards to more standardized testing to school-based management. Most of the reforms adopted in this period operated within the highly bureaucratic system established by progressives in the early 20th century. Indeed, new policies on standards and testing were designed to further bureaucratize and centralize the education system. These types of reforms, Chubb and Moe argued in their influential Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, were destined to fail, since they failed to address the institutional problems underlying K-12 education’s woes. The most important factor determining a school’s performance, they proposed , was its level of autonomy. And a top-down bureaucratic management structure was anathema to holding schools accountable while maintaining school autonomy. Market control, versus democratic control, they argued, would allow for greater school autonomy and, as a result, improved academic performance. Chubb and Moe thus pushed for an alternative set of reforms aimed at decentralizing the education system, instilling choice, and leveraging market competition to achieve improvements. Similar ideas were also being promoted on the left side of the political spectrum. In 1988, University of Massachusetts professor Ray Budde released Education by Charter: Restructuring School Districts.Budde advocated for allowing innovative teachers to apply for special charters to create new programs, thus devolving authority down to teachers and enhancing their autonomy. American Federation of Teachers president Al Shanker latched onto the chartering concept and promoted it as a way for teachers and their unions to maintain their central role in the face of seemingly inevitable education reforms. Chartering thus emerged in this period as a “middle-path” between the highly rigid existing system and a privatized system of vouchers promoted by those on the far right of the political spectrum . Policy entrepreneurs first took chartering from concept to law in the state of Minnesota. The effort was led by Joe Nathan, a former Minnesota teacher who had written a book promoting the charter school concept and then worked for the National Governors Association’s education reform group commissioned by Lamar Alexander and Bill Clinton. Nathan partnered with Ted Kolderie from Citizens League, a moderate “good government” Minnesota think-tank, and former State Senator Ember Reichgott Junge to develop and enact a bill that would put in place a process for schools to apply for charters to operate independently of school districts. The Minnesota bill was ultimately supported by a minority of the Democratic party , but by enough Republicans to pass. Bipartisan support within the “window of opportunity” generated from attention to education reform was critical to overcoming opposition from teachers unions and school boards in Minnesota, and later, elsewhere . Contrary to Al Shanker’s hopes, charter laws generally did not establish a role for teachers unions in the chartering process, instead generally specifying that new charter schools could operate outside of negotiated collective bargaining contracts.