SB 1993 was introduced around the same time by Del. George Grayson , which was an extremely weak bill that only required no-smoking areas in very limited areas of hospitals and did not specify an enforcement agency, although it did specify a $3,000 fine for violation. It was amended in the House Health, Welfare, and Institutions committee to be completely voluntary with no provision for fines or enforcement. Grayson attempted to substitute the bill with its original language, but the measure failed, and the bill died when the legislature adjourned without considering it further.In response to HB 430 and SB 130, the tobacco industry quickly rallied to draft a bill that would serve its interests. Senator Virgil Goode, Jr. who was very sympathetic to tobacco interests, introduced SB 601, which gave private employers and the governing bodies of hospitals and institutions of higher education the sole authority to designate no-smoking areas. It also included preemption language that prevented any locality from enacting stronger restrictions in private workplaces after July 1, 1989.Goode’s bill merely codified a right that private employers, hospitals, and institutions of higher education already had.It was no secret by this point that the industry was pushing for preemption. In February 1989 some newspapers, including the Hampton Roads Daily Press and the Christian Science Monitor, had picked up on the preemption language in several bills.As it became clear to the press that Goode’s statewide law would “take away local government’s power to enact laws restricting smoking in public places,” newspapers began specifically referring to the preemption aspect of the bill.

Initially, Goode’s bill to end local ordinances regulating tobacco was to take effect immediately,commercial shelving systems but it was amended to change the implementation date several times. While the bill was being considered, Anthony Troy met with Del. Cohen to discuss the situation. Both men determined that neither side would be able to claim a decisive victory over SB 601, and came up with a compromise – a one-year sunset provision that would freeze any local ordinances regulating tobacco until July 1, 1990, postponing debate on the issue of local regulation and giving both sides a chance to regroup.Cohen agreed to this sunset provision on the condition that industry forces would meet with health groups to discuss finding common ground on state-wide legislation concerning smoking restrictions.On the strength of this understanding, Goode’s bill was overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 84-14 in the House, and the Senate concurred with the final date of implementation 38-0, sending the bill to Governor Gerald L. Baliles .Virginia GASP members were not pleased with the moratorium. On March 22, 1989 they held a vigil in Richmond attempting to influence Gov. Baliles to veto the measure.These efforts were unsuccessful; Gov. Baliles explained that he signed the bill for two reasons: it was passed overwhelmingly, and would only be in effect for one year.Donley had previously approached Baliles’ office in an attempt to secure his support for clean indoor air legislation. After Baliles left office, Donley learned that Baliles owned a large amount of stock in a tobacco company, Dimon, Inc., although she was unaware of whether he had this financial interest during his term as governor.He later became a member of the board of directors at Philip Morris in 2008.The tobacco industry had mustered their significant resources to block the Grayson/Michie bills. Michie later described how “outmatched his anti-smoking witnesses were.”While proponents of the bills relied on the testimony of health advocates, the industry used its powerful influence with retail and manufacturer associations.

According to Michie, “[t]he Virginia Manufacturers’ Association spoke against my bill; the retail merchants spoke against it; the restaurant association spoke against it; the Farm Bureau spoke against it; and then, finally, the AFL-CIO spoke against it.”In a newspaper interview later that year, the Vice President of the Tobacco Institute, Walker Merryman, was candid about the industry’s influence over these interest groups, stating “[o]bviously, [opposing the bill is] made a lot easier if you have a lobbyist who’s been in the state capitol and knows the executive director of the state hospitality association and the state chamber of commerce and the state AFL-CIO and all the other groups that might help.”With this intensive lobbying pressure from tobacco industry forces, many legislators were influenced, but some were not swayed. Del. Ralph Axselle described his sentiment that “Philip Morris is one of Richmond’s premiere corporate citizens . . . [t]hey do a lot of good things for their community; they run a good company.”However, Del. Axselle sent out a questionnaire to his constituents, and 85% of the respondents supported smoking restrictions.Based on the support of his constituents for smoking restrictions, Axselle voted against the industry-sponsored measure, SB 601.GASP noted that two other legislators, Sens. Holland and Walker, also changed their votes to oppose the tobacco industry’s position based on letters from their constituents solicited by both GASP and the Tri-Agency Council.One of the tobacco control advocates’ goals for the meeting was to attempt to sway traditional tobacco allies away from their entrenched support for the industry. As Anne Donley of GASP told the Associated Press at the time, “My biggest hope is that these groups who have traditionally supported the tobacco industry will begin to see through the propaganda.”However, industry groups did not break ranks, citing tobacco industry language about “accommodation” and smoker’s rights, tactics commonly used by the industry to weaken the position of health advocates at the expense of public health. Industry lobbyists Troy and Sutherland strenuously opposed any effective restrictions on smoking whatsoever, claiming it would lead to job losses and decreased sales of tobacco products. Furthermore, the Tobacco Institute’s position was that “[t]he tobacco industry will never agree to allow Virginia to have any laws stronger than what any other tobacco state has.”

The Virginia Manufacturer’s Association and the Virginia Restaurant Association both agreed with the Tobacco Institute lobbyists. The Virginia Hospitality Association made their position clear that they wanted no regulation of restaurants, strongly preferring voluntary restrictions.From the industry perspective, the growth of the Washington DC suburban areas in Northern Virginia had changed the demographic makeup of the state, diluting some of the historically important electorate of the tobacco-growing regions. Furthermore, the industry was feeling the growing influence of the health advocacy groups and their support from the public in the tobacco control arena. The Tobacco Institute blamed the necessity for such action on both changing demographics and to the more aggressive and organized tactics of the health voluntaries and tobacco control organizations.The Tobacco Institute’s final position was model legislative language taking an aggressive position that sought not only to prevent new local laws but sought to roll back all existing local ordinances that regulated smoking in restaurants.The proposed language only prohibited smoking in limited areas such as elevators and public buildings,mobile shelving systems while requiring no-smoking areas in retail businesses, healthcare facilities, and restaurants with more than 50seats.It would not have regulated smoking in bars, private hospital rooms, or common areas of malls.The industry language also sought to disallow the regulation of smoking in private workplaces, leaving those decisions entirely up to management.This proposal was completely unacceptable to the health groups at the table.After three meetings, the groups did not reach an agreement and the meetings concluded in late 1989. Both sides presented draft legislation to each other during the meetings, but none were acceptable to the other side. The tobacco industry groups presented two bills and Cohen and Michie presented several bills, including a modified version of the Virginia Beach smoking restriction ordinance.Despite a lack of agreement between the two sides, Donley in 2009 felt that the meetings had positive side effects.For one, the industry had insisted that neither side speak to the media during the meetings; this lead the press to speculate about what might be occurring in the meetings, which kept the public engaged with the issue of smoking restrictions.

Furthermore, GASP, ALA and ACS used the summer of 1989 to organize their volunteers and members to continue to call and write to legislators pressing them on the issue.Thus Donley felt that an important but unforeseen outcome of the meetings was that it prevented the momentum generated in the 1989 session from flagging before the 1990 session began. The fight in the 1990 legislative session was anticipated well in advance, with both the industry and health advocates bracing for a fight as the moratorium ended. However, the substance of what might actually pass was still greatly in flux. On January 3, 1990 the Richmond News Leader conducted its annual legislative survey that probed opinions on a variety of issues. Of the 18 senators and 52 delegates who responded to inquiries, 41 responded in opposition to a preemptive statewide smoking law; at that point strong majorities of responding legislators supported allowing localities to regulate smoking. The poll did not gauge legislators’ opinions about a statewide smoking law.In a 2009 interview, Donley of GASP said that she had not been aware of this survey at the time.Also early in 1990, the Tri-Agency Council formed a new coalition, Virginians for Clean Indoor Air , to include more groups in the Tri-Agency Council’s push for clean indoor air legislation.By January 10, VCIA had recruited eight other state groups: the Virginia Medical Society, the Virginia Perinatal Association, the Virginia Chapter of the March of Dimes, the American Diabetes Association of Virginia, the League of Women Voters of Virginia, Virginia American Academy of Pediatrics, Virginia Pediatric Society, and the Virginia Nurses’ Association of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.GASP was not included in the group, and GASP and VCIA would support different bills in the 1990 session. The VCIA quickly took a deal-breaker position opposing local preemption, with William Miller, a spokesperson, stating, “This is not a point for compromise.”The VCIA announced that the bill they would sponsor would be introduced as SB 440 by Sen. J. Macfarlane , who had been an opponent of clean air legislation. Nevertheless, a VCIA spokesperson called Macfarlane’s proposal “a modest and reasonable bill.”As introduced, the bill had strong anti-preemption language, explicitly stating that its statewide provisions were the minimum standards governing public health preemption and that local governments could adopt “consistent” but stronger local ordinances. However, the statewide provisions were very weak ; no coverage was given to restaurants or retail establishments, and many public spaces such as schools and healthcare facilities were only given partial coverage. SB 440 was subsequently amended in the Senate Local Government Committee where the strong anti-preemption language was replaced with strict preemption which would sunset in four years.The VCIA would not show GASP, Del. Cohen, or Sen. Michie the language of SB 440 prior to introducing it. In a 2009 interview, Anne Donley of GASP recalled that it was surprising that the VCIA kept Cohen and Michie in the dark because they had worked together before on the same issue. As Donley remarked, “you never did that to a legislator. You would never go behind their back … when you’ve been working with them and supporting them.”Donley recalled that it was common in the legislature at the time, as a courtesy, to give both legislative allies and opponents some forewarning of a bill pertinent to that legislator, so he or she would not be surprised or embarrassed about not knowing its contents. Donley characterized this as a “betrayal” to Cohen and Michie.The Macfarlane bill competed with Del. Cohen’s and Sen. Michie’s bills, HB 562 and SB 150, which did not included preemption, had a higher $50 fine for violation and had clear enforcement language. Michie and Cohen characterized Macfarlane’s bill as progressive, but also felt like it did not go far enough in restricting smoking in retail establishments. HB 562 and SB 150 both designated retail stores with more than 20,000 square feet as public places, requiring the person in charge of the space to “designate reasonably substantial areas of the public place as nonsmoking areas.” However, Macfarlane’s bill, SB 440, required no-smoking areas only in designated “public breathing spaces.”