Ibudilast did not improve negative mood on drinking or non-drinking days, indicating that its mechanism of action may be non-mood dependent in non-treatment-seeking individuals. Ibudilast reduced the probability of HDDs over 2 weeks for non-treatment-seeking individuals relative to placebo. Ibudilast also attenuated alcohol cue-elicited activation in the VS, potentially through a dopaminergic-related mechanism. This is a critical proof-of-mechanism whereby modulation of neuroimmune signaling via ibudilast reduced the incentive salience of alcohol cues in the brain. Exploratory analyses indicated that ventral striatal activation to alcohol cues was predictive of subsequent drinking in the ibudilast group, such that individuals who had attenuated ventral striatal activation and were treated with ibudilast had the fewest number of drinks per drinking day in the week following the scan. Overall, these findings extend preclinical and human laboratory demonstrations of the efficacy of ibudilast for the treatment of AUD and suggest a potential bio-behavioral mechanism through which ibudilast acts. This study also demonstrates that ibudilast has a favorable side effect profile, even when combined with alcohol. These findings also provide novel insights into the role of neuroimmune modulation in AUD, including its effects on neural and behavioral outcomes of high clinical significance.Imagine, in the near future, you walk into a supermarket with a list of things to buy that you usually keep around the house. You walk in and go straight for the cereal aisle, because you are out of your favorite sugary “fruit loops” cereal. You approach the cereal only to double-take, because all the boxes now look the same. Instead of the colorful box you are used to, there is a plain white box with a large photo of rotting teeth that says, “Fruit Loops” in the same plain font as every other cereal box on the aisle. It just doesn’t feel right to buy the fruit loops without the normal packaging,gardening rack so you move to the next item on your list. Now imagine you decide to buy some beer for an upcoming dinner party. You walk to the beer aisle to pick out the most appealing brand. But as you approach the aisle, you realize that, like the cereal, every type of beer looks the same.

All the beer is packaged in a dark brown color with photos of failed livers and cars wrapped around telephone poles. The beers have different names, but the font and text size are identical. Instead of gravitating to the beers that look interesting, you must try to find a brand name that sounds like something your friend may like. After fifteen minutes, you get frustrated and give up. Finally, you decide to leave the store, but not before grabbing a carton of your favorite cigarettes. You approach the register and notice that again, all the tobacco products look similar. The cigarettes are packaged in an olive-green box with photos of black lungs and large warnings that say, “smoking causes cancer.” This is the last straw. You storm out of the supermarket, having spent twenty minutes shopping and coming away empty handed. The packaging was part of the fun, and it has been taken away from you. You enjoyed playing the games on the back of the fruit loops box. You loved the artistic beer packages that had the added value of convenience. Given the World Trade Organization’s recent decision to uphold plain packaging laws in Australia, this dystopian hypothetical could be a reality.Australia was the first country in the world to implement plain packaging laws for tobacco products with the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act of 20112 , and others have followed suit. Countries like Britain, France, and Hungary have already passed plain packaging laws, while others like Ireland, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Belgium are considering the idea.Countries that export tobacco, like Indonesia, are angered by the measures and the negative economic impact it will have. In 2013, Indonesia launched an attack on Australia’s new laws by requesting a consultation from the WTO.A five year legal battle ensued, ending in a landmark decision by the WTO that was a major blow to big tobacco.This Paper will discuss the WTO’s decision and the potential impact, whether good or bad, this decision could have moving forward. Indonesia claims that Australia’s laws contradict their obligations under three major agreements recognized by the WTO: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade , the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights , and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The following Parts will discuss the claims made under the TBT Agreement, TRIPS Agreement, and the GATT, as well as provide a prediction of the panel’s legal analysis and debate the possible impact it may have on the future of packaging and product advertising.It seeks to discourage its citizens from smoking, prevent relapse for those who have quit, and reduce overall exposure to tobacco products.In this spirit, the TPPA regulates “the retail packaging and appearance of tobacco products”, and therefore can “reduce the appeal of tobacco products . . . increase the effectiveness of health warnings . . . and reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to mislead consumers about the harmful effects of smoking.”The TPPA enforces stringent requirements for the packaging of all tobacco products and establishes penalties and sanctions for violations.The Act regulates all tobacco products but includes specific regulations for cigarettes as well.For example, cigarette packaging must be rigid, have a matte finish, be made of cardboard, and must not be “embellished in any way, [unless] permitted by the regulations.”The color of the packaging must be a drab brown color , with the only exceptions being health warnings and brand names.The TPPA also states that no trademarks can appear on packaging except for the company name, relevant legislative materials, and any trademarks permitted by the TPPR.Further, the brand or company name must comply with specific provisions set out in the TPPR and may only appear once on the packaging.The TPPR establishes requirements for specific colors, dimensions, and features of the packaging.These regulations not only give the packaging a uniform and unattractive appearance, they also help prevent tobacco companies from misleading consumers and maximize the effectiveness of the health warnings.The color of the packaging must be “Pantone 448C,” a dull olive green and brown mixture like the color mentioned in the above hypothetical.These regulations also state that writings, other than health warnings, must be “in the typeface known as Lucida Sans . . . no larger than 10 points in size . . . in a normal weighted regular font . . . and in the colour known as Pantone Cool Gray 2C.”Indonesia cites to Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT, which fall under the “Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by Central Government Bodies” section of the agreement.Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement declares that member states “shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”

In an earlier case, US-Clove Cigarettes , Indonesia complained that the United States violated,vertical farming equipment among other things, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.28 Similar to its later complaint in Australia-Plain Packaging, Indonesia challenged U.S. regulations that were created to promote public health by dissuading tobacco use.Specifically, Indonesia challenged measures that banned flavored tobacco and clove cigarettes but not menthol cigarettes.Because Indonesia is a large producer of clove cigarettes, and the United States is a large producer of menthol cigarettes, Indonesia claimed the regulations “accorded to imported clove cigarettes less favourable treatment than that accorded to like menthol cigarettes of national origin.”This vital Appellate Body decision articulated the proper test for determining a violation of Article 2.1.According to the Appellate Body, to establish a violation of Article 2.1, “three elements must be satisfied: the measure at issue must be a technical regulation; the imported and domestic products at issue must be like products; and the treatment accorded to imported products must be less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products.”Regarding the first element, Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines the term “technical regulation” as a “[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.”Because regulations in question are likely to be agreed upon as technical regulations, this element of the test need not be further discussed. The second element of the test requires that the imported and domestic products be “like.”In Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body addressed the meaning of like products in the context of Article 2.1.Although it agreed that menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes were like products, it disagreed with the way the Panel came to that conclusion.According to the Appellate Body, the Panel erred in focusing on “the purposes of the technical regulation at issue, as separate from the competitive relationship between and among the products.”The proper analysis of like products must take into consideration the context of “Article 2.1 itself . . . other provisions of the TBT Agreement . . . the TBT Agreement as a whole, and . . . Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, as well as the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement . . . ”When viewed in this context, the test for likeness should be “based on the competitive relationship between and among the products . . . ”The third element, that “the treatment accorded to imported products must be less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products”, was also addressed by the Appellate Body in Clove Ciga-rettes.The Appellate Body first noted that, in the context of the TBT Agreement, Article 2.1’s “treatment no less favorable” requirement prohibits both de jure and de facto discrimination.However, to analyze Article 2.1 in the context of the similarly worded Article III:4 of the GATT, the Appellate Body noted that any examination of an Article 2.1 violation “should seek to ascertain whether the technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of competition in the market of the regulating Member to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis the group of like domestic products.”In light of these conflicting ideas, the Appellate Body concluded that where measures do not “de jure discriminate against imports, the existence of a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for the group of imported vis-à-vis the group of domestic like products is not dispositive of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1.”Instead, the correct approach is to “analyze whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against the group of imported products.”A detrimental impact stemming from a legitimate distinction is determined by careful scrutiny of the particular circumstances of the case.After careful scrutiny, the Appellate Body determined that the U.S. measure did not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.Specifically, the Appellate Body cited the purpose behind the measure as a reason why it was not in compliance with Article 2.1.Because the measure was enacted to deter youth smoking by banning flavored cigarettes, and menthol cigarettes are flavored, there was no reason for menthol cigarettes to be exempted.The TRIPS Agreement was also enacted as a part of the establishment of the WTO in 1995.Its purpose is to “reduce distortions and impediments to international trade . . . and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade . . . ”Indonesia cites to, inter alia, Article 3.1 in its Request for Consultations.This Part will examine Article 3.1 and its WTO jurisprudence. Article 3.1 is the “National Treatment” provision of the TRIPS Agreement, much like Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT. Article 3.1 states, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . . ”WTO jurisprudence on Article 3.1 is scant, but one dispute heard by the Panel, EC-Trademarks and Geographical Indications, discusses the application of Article 3.1 in detail.